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LITIGATING ALTERNATIVE FACTS:
SCHOOL VACCINE MANDATES IN THE COURTS
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss*
ABSTRACT
In June 2015, California’s governor signed into law SB277, which removed the personal belief exemption to
school immunization requirements, making medical exemptions the only valid way to send an unvaccinated child
in the affected categories to school. Naturally, vaccine-hesitant parents opposed the legislation. After their efforts
failed in the legislature, they turned to the courts, raising arguments old and new. To date, opponents have filed
five lawsuits against the new California law, all of which have failed. This Article explains why courts in the
United States, which have consistently upheld school immunization requirements, are correct to do so. These
requirements are supported by strong policy reasons and serve a compelling interest, since they dramatically reduce
the risk of outbreaks of potentially deadly diseases. These mandates fit with our basic principles of state police
power, reasonable limits on individual rights, and protecting children. They are also supported by over a hundred
years of jurisprudence. Using the opponents’ arguments to identify the strongest claims against SB277, the Article
explains why those arguments—including claims based in the First Amendment, in parental rights, and in the
right to education—cannot stand.
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INTRODUCTION
School immunization mandates have existed for over a century in the
United States, and have been litigated ever since their creation.1 In each
legislative session at least some states see bills introduced addressing these
mandates.2 The predicted constitutionality of the proposed bills is debated
during the legislative process, as are the arguments that courts address. In
April of 2017, one anti-vaccine organization published that they were tracking
“173 Vaccine Bills in 40 States.”3 This Article explains why so far, no court,
state or federal, in the United States has found state school immunization
mandates unconstitutional. This is true even when states have set limits on
the scope of religious exemptions from the mandates.4 It demonstrates why
upholding school immunization requirements is the right thing to do, both
from a legal and policy perspective. The Article uses the recent litigation
surrounding the California law enacted in 2015, which removed the personal

1
2

3

4

For an early example of school immunization mandates litigation, see Abeel v. Clark, 24 P. 383
(Cal. 1890).
Allison M. Buttenheim, The Vaccination-Exemption Challenge, GOVERNING (July 11, 2017),
http://www.governing.com/gov-institute/voices/col-stronger-state-laws-vaccinationimmunization-exemption-school-entry.html.
Jefferey Jaxen, Activate: NVIC Now Monitoring 173 Vaccine Bills in 40 States, JEFFREYJAXEN.COM (Apr.
25, 2017), http://www.jeffereyjaxen.com/news/activate-nvic-now-monitoring-173-vaccine-billsin-40-states.
Dorit R. Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God in Vain: Use and Abuse of Religious
Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1567–70 (2014).
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belief exemption to school immunization requirements, to set out its
argument. The Article takes seriously the best arguments against mandates—
including new arguments, or old arguments in new forms—and explains why
they cannot stand. Politically, school immunization requirements may face
heated battles. In the reason-based world of the law, vaccine mandates
correctly enjoy broad, strong support, because extensive evidence shows that
the mandates are sound policy serving important goals of preventing
outbreaks and protecting children and the community.
School immunization requirements have been the focus of many court
and legislative battles since at least the 19th century. They are likely to remain
contentious, because the stakes are high both for those who acknowledge the
benefits of vaccines and are concerned about outbreaks, and for those who
see vaccines as harmful and are afraid to vaccinate their children.
Although none of the five lawsuits against SB277 had gone beyond trial
level at this point,5 the validity of school immunization mandates is an
important legal question expected to arise in other states as well.6 In addition
to legal relevance, school immunization mandates affect the rate of
immunization in the state, and stricter mandates are linked to higher rates of
immunization and fewer outbreaks.7 Their constitutional validity therefore
directly affects the health of communities and children.
As this Article demonstrates, SB277 lawsuits were correctly rejected—
and courts should continue to reject such claims. Basically, opponents of
SB277 face two obstacles they have yet to overcome. One is precedent: for
over a century, our jurisprudence has solidly and consistently found school
immunization mandates to be constitutional, with no requirement that states
provide non-medical exemptions. The other is the policy rationale
supporting such strong constitutional jurisprudence: scientific studies
demonstrate both that school immunization mandates reduce the risk of
preventable diseases and that vaccines are safe and effective. Mandates fit
neatly into our basic principles, which allow reasonable public health
regulation even when it interferes with individual rights.

5
6

7

Though two are under appeal.
During 2017, both Florida and Michigan have seen litigation on the issue. See Flynn v. Estevez, 221
So. 3d 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (concerning whether a diocesan school district may require
all its students to be immunized, where Florida law allows parents to claim a religious exemption
from immunization for their children); Nikolao v. Lyon, 238 F. Supp. 3d 964, 968 (E.D. Mich.
2017) (describing a county health department’s alleged violation of the First Amendment in its
treatment of a mother seeking to exempt her children from immunization).
W. David Bradford & Anne Mandich, Some State Vaccination Laws Contribute to Greater Exemption Rates
and Disease Outbreaks in the United States, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1383, 1383 (2015).
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The lawsuits against vaccine mandates are often (though not always)
brought by people who believe, contrary to the strong empirical evidence,
that vaccines are dangerous; they are reluctant to vaccinate their children for
that reason. As a result, litigants are fighting at a disadvantage. They are
arguing against both a policy that protects children specifically and the
community generally, and against a legislative judgment on health issues
supported by extensive evidence. For these reasons, courts—correctly—
have consistently rejected opponents’ challenges to school mandates.8
The focus of this Article is to provide a fair examination of the most
plausible claims against school immunization mandates, put forth by people
with a real passion and strong feelings about the topic. The SB277 lawsuits,
representing opponents’ best efforts, help achieve that goal.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses vaccines, school
immunization mandates, and the literature about both. It demonstrates that
strong evidence shows that vaccines are safe and effective and that school
mandates work—and it shows the problem California faced as its
immunization rates declined. Part II discusses SB277 and its passage, setting
out the trigger to the act—the Disneyland measles outbreak—the thorough
deliberative process SB277 went through, and the broad support it enjoyed.
Part III provides a short description of the lawsuits, addresses the
reformulation of the facts by opponents, and then sets out the basic principles
governing school mandates. Part IV examines the efforts of opponents to
challenge the validity of SB277, addressing the most plausible (but still not
compelling) arguments first—covering right to education, religious freedom,
and unconstitutional conditions. It continues by examining arguments that
are plausible, but have already been discussed and dismissed by multiple
courts: parental freedom, equal protection, and substantive due process. It
ends with two very weak arguments, the claim that liability protections for
vaccine manufacturers cannot coexist with mandates, and the claim that
legislators passing SB277 engaged in racketeering activity.

8

That is not to say that there have been no legal victories for opponents of mandatory immunization.
For example, opponents have succeeded in striking down attempts to limit religious exemptions to
members of organized religions, Dalli v. Bd. of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219, 222–23 (Mass. 1971), and
in having statutes empowering officials to deny exemptions construed narrowly. In re LePage, 18
P.3d 1177, 1180 (Wyo. 2001); see also Reiss, supra note 4, at 1567–70. But as the Article details, they
have failed in getting immunization mandates struck down, or having a court declare that a nonmedical exemption is required.
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I. BACKGROUND: VACCINES AND SCHOOL MANDATES
Vaccines are one of the great modern medical advances.9 In the United
States alone, vaccines prevent tens of thousands of deaths and millions of
hospitalizations each year.10 Worldwide, vaccines prevent millions of deaths
each year, and could prevent more if broader coverage was achieved.11 Like
all medical interventions, vaccines carry a risk of serious harm, but that risk is
extremely low; serious harm from vaccines is very rare.12 To give one
example, the very serious risk of a severe allergic reaction to vaccines—one
that if left untreated can be fatal—is around one per million.13 Similarly, the
risk of immune thrombocytopenic purpura (“ITP”), a blood platelet disorder,
occurring after receipt of the Measles, Mumps and Rubella vaccine (“MMR”)
is about 1 in 22,300 people, with most cases resolving within 6 months (note
that the risk of ITP from measles infection is much higher).14 But as vaccines
led to dramatic decreases in preventable diseases, some people have become
more concerned about risks (real or imagined) of vaccines than their benefits.
In words cited by the Supreme Court, vaccines are “victims of their own
success.”15 For multiple reasons, past years have seen the rise of an antivaccine movement16 that has had some legislative success.17
High vaccination rates are important to prevent outbreaks. If a high
enough percentage of people is immune to a disease—whether through
vaccination or through getting the disease—the chances of an outbreak
decrease and may even completely disappear; this is the concept known as
herd or community immunity.18 The idea is that if there are enough immune
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Michael Worboys, Vaccines: Conquering Untreatable Diseases, 334 BMJ 19 (2007).
Cynthia G. Whitney et al., Benefits from Immunization During the Vaccines for Children Program Era— United
States, 1994–2013, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. (Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6316a4.htm.
Immunization Coverage Fact Sheet, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (July 16, 2018),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs378/en/.
Margaret A. Maglione et al., Safety of Vaccines Used for Routine Immunization of US Children: A Systematic
Review, 134 PEDIATRICS 325, 325 (2014).
Michael McNeil et al., Risk of Anaphylaxis after Vaccination in Children and Adults, 137 J. ALLERGY
CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 868, 868 (2016).
Elizabeth Miller et al., Idiopathic Thrombocytopenic Purpura and MMR Vaccine, 84 ARCHIVE DISEASES
CHILDHOOD 227, 228 (2001).
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 562 U.S. 223, 226 (2011).
PAUL A. OFFIT, DEADLY CHOICES: HOW THE ANTI-VACCINE MOVEMENT THREATENS US ALL
2–11 (2011).
Denise F. Lillvis et al., Power and Persuasion in the Vaccine Debates: An Analysis of Political Efforts and
Outcomes in the United States, 1998–2012, 92 MILBANK Q. 475, 495 (2014).
T. Jacob John & Reuben Samuel, Herd Immunity and Herd Effect: New Insights and Definitions, 16 EUR.
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 601, 602–03 (2000). I also discuss this in Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Herd Immunity
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people, germs—even those introduced by non-immune travelers—are less
likely to spread and reach the few people in the community who are not
immune and are susceptible to infection.19 The corollary is that when
vaccination rates drop, for example, because a congregation of people chose
not to vaccinate, herd immunity is undermined, and the risk of outbreaks
increases.20
One of the best ways to increase immunization rates and achieve herd
immunity is through implementation of school immunization requirements.
While they have a long history, going back at least to the 19th century, these
requirements became more commonplace in the second half of the 20th
century.21 Today, all states and the District of Columbia have school
immunization requirements, though states vary in the specific vaccines
required and other details. California, for example, requires that children be
vaccinated against ten diseases before attending school: diphtheria,
Haemophilus influenzae type b (“Hib”), measles, mumps, pertussis, polio,
rubella, tetanus, hepatitis B, and varicella (“chickenpox”).22 All states,
however, provide some type of exemptions from school immunization
requirements. Court battles tend to focus on exemptions. All states allow
medical exemptions, and most also recognize some type of non-medical
exemption, such as religious or personal belief exemptions.23 States vary in
the type of exemptions allowed and the ease of obtaining them.24 Studies
consistently show that when exemptions are easier to obtain, higher
exemption rates tend to occur.25 Studies also consistently show that higher

19
20

21

22
23
24

25

and Immunization Policy: The Importance of Accuracy, 94 OR. L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2015).
Charlotte A. Moser & Paul A. Offit, News & Views: Herd Immunity and Vaccine Duration, CHILD. HOSP.
PHILA. (Nov. 03, 2014), http://www.chop.edu/news/herd-immunity-and-vaccine-duration.
Paul Fine et al., “Herd Immunity”: A Rough Guide, 52 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 911, 914
(2011) (“Social clustering among parents who decide not to vaccinate their children can result in
groups of children in which vaccination levels are well below the herd immunity threshold. The
same effect is found in religious communities that eschew vaccination . . . .”).
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis: Legal
Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal, 63 BUFFALO L. REV. 881, 892 (2015)
(discussing the early adoption of inoculation practices by Massachusetts in 1855 and enactment of
vaccinations requirements for schools through the 20th century).
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120335 (West 2016).
Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 915.
Y. Tony Yang & Ross D. Silverman, Legislative Prescriptions for Controlling Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions,
313 [J]AMA 247, 247–48 (2015) (discussing non-medical exemptions ranging from exemptions for
strictly medical issues to religious exemptions, and reviewing the difficulty in obtaining exemptions
in different states).
Nina R. Blank et al., Exempting Schoolchildren from Immunizations: States with Few Barriers Had Highest
Rates of Nonmedical Exemptions, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1282, 1289 (2013) (confirming the inverse
relationship “between non-medical exemptions rates and the complexity of exemption applications
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exemption rates lead to outbreaks of preventable diseases.26
With this background, it is not surprising that declines in vaccination
rates tend to lead states to try to tighten exemption laws. For example,
recently in Texas, the response to rising rates of exemptions was an
introduction of (unsuccessful, as of yet) bills aimed at making it harder to get
exemptions.27 Earlier, both Washington state and Oregon passed bills
requiring parents seeking exemptions to fulfill an educational requirement
before obtaining an exemption.28
In 2010, California saw an outbreak of whooping cough that dwarfed
previous outbreaks. The outbreak exceeded 9,000 cases, 809 people were
hospitalized, and ten infants younger than three months of age died from the
disease.29 This was much, much higher than previous decades.30 Multiple
studies found an association between locations of outbreaks and high

26

27

28
29
30

procedures”); Jennifer S. Rota et al., Processes for Obtaining Nonmedical Exemptions to State Immunization
Laws, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 645, 645 (2001) (finding that less complex non-medical exemption
application processes increase the number of parents claiming exemptions for children); Stephanie
Stadlin et al., Medical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements in the United States—Association of
State Policies with Medical Exemption Rates (2004–2011), 206 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 989, 989 (2012)
(finding that states with easier medical exemption methods had an increased number of
exemptions); Yang & Silverman, supra note 24, at 248 (reviewing the range of exemptions nationally
and recommending more stringent laws for obtaining non-medical exemptions).
Daniel R. Feikin et al., Individual and Community Risks of Measles and Pertussis Associated with Personal
Exemptions to Immunization, 284 [J]AMA 3145, 3145 (2000) (finding that the schools with higher
numbers of measles and pertussis outbreaks had more vaccine exemptors); Aamer Imdad et al.,
Religious Exemptions for Immunization and Risk of Pertussis in New York State, 2000–2011, 132 PEDIATRICS
37, 40, 42 (2013) (finding that higher rates of pertussis occurred in areas with higher numbers of
vaccine exemptions); Saad B. Omer et al., Geographic Clustering of Nonmedical Exemptions to School
Immunization Requirements and Associations with Geographic Clustering of Pertussis, 168 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
1389, 1394 (2008) (finding that “community-level risk[s] of outbreaks [are] also increased in the
presence of geographic clusters of [vaccine] exemptors”); Saad B. Omer et al., Nonmedical Exemptions
to School Immunization Requirements: Secular Trends and Association of State Policies with Pertussis Incidence, 296
[J]AMA 1757, 1757 (2006) (finding that states allowing personal belief exemptions and easily
granting them was associated with an increased incidence of pertussis); Jennifer L. Richards et al.,
Nonmedical Exemptions to Immunization Requirements in California: A 16-Year Longitudinal Analysis of Trends
and Associated Community Factors, 31 VACCINE 3009, 3009 (2013) (confirming an increase in nonmedical exemptions in California from 1994 to 2009 and comparing data between geographic
regions); Daniel A. Salmon et al., Health Consequences of Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from
Immunization Laws, 281 [J]AMA 47, 47 (1999) (finding that increases in the number of vaccine
exemptors caused an increased incidence of measles in non-exempt individuals).
Julie Chang, Bills Target High Rates of Texas Schoolchildren Lacking Vaccinations, MYSTATESMAN (Dec.
07, 2016), https://www.statesman.com/NEWS/20170109/Bills-target-high-rates-of-Texasschoolchildren-lacking-vaccinations.
Lillvis et al., supra note 17, at 502.
Kathleen Winter et al., California Pertussis Epidemic, 2010, 161 J. PEDIATRICS 1091, 1091, 1093–94 (2012).
Jessica E. Atwell et al., Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions and Pertussis in California, 2010, 132
PEDIATRICS 624, 624 (2013); Omer et al. supra note 26, at 1389.
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vaccination exemption rates, including the California outbreak mentioned
earlier.31 These data strongly supported a link between the outbreak and
California’s exemptions rates increasing dramatically over the previous
decade.32
In 2012, California passed AB2109. The law required that parents
seeking a personal belief exemption get a doctor’s signature on a portion of
the exemption form stating that a healthcare provider informed parents
about the risks and benefits of vaccines and the risks of the diseases they
prevent.33 Governor Brown added a statement to the law requiring the
California Health Department to add a separate religious exemption on the
form.34 The bill came into effect in January 2014, and the following year
exemption rates declined somewhat. 35
And then, the Disneyland measles outbreak started.

31

32

33

34

35

See, e.g., Maimuna S. Majunder et al., Substandard Vaccination Compliance and the 2015 Outbreak, 169
[J]AMA PEDIATRICS 494, 494 (2015); Atwell et al., supra note 30, at 627; Imdad et al., supra note
26.
See Richards et al., supra note 26, at 3012 (confirming an increase in nonmedical exemptions to
kindergarten vaccine requirements for California schools from 1994 through 2009, and
highlighting the need for more stringent rules for obtaining such exemptions).
Assemb. B. 2109, 2011–12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); Senate OKs Bill Targeting Unvaccinated Students,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Aug. 22, 2012, 5:12 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdutsenate-oks-bill-targeting-unvaccinated-students-2012aug22-story.html.
Signing Statement of Edmund G. Brown Jr., Office of the Governor, Assemb. B. 2109, 2011–12
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (“I will direct the department to allow for a separate religious exemption
on the form. In this way, people whose religious beliefs preclude vaccinations will not be required
to seek a health care practitioner’s signature.”). However, Governor Brown may have unlawfully
altered the law with the addition of a religious exemption form, which AB2109 did not stipulate.
See Dorit R. Reiss, Viewpoint: Signing Statement on Vaccines Is Not Law, U.C. HASTINGS RECORDER
(Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/1202622728667/viewpoint-signingstatement-on-vaccines-is-not-law/ (arguing that the governor’s signing statement went beyond the
law and was ultra vires). This theory has not been tested in court.
CAL. DEP’T HEALTH, IMMUNIZATION BRACH, 2014–2015 KINDERGARTEN IMMUNIZATION
ASSESSMENT
RESULTS
1
(2015),
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/CDPH%20Document%20Library/Immuniz
ation/2017-2018KindergartenSummaryReport.pdf.
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II. SB277 AND ITS PASSAGE
A. The Measles Outbreak
In early 2015, California experienced what turned out to be a large
outbreak of measles, which eventually spanned seventeen states, Mexico, and
Canada.36 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”)
described the outbreak as follows:
On January 5, 2015, the California Department of Public Health (CDPH)
was notified about a suspected measles case. The patient was a hospitalized,
unvaccinated child, aged 11 years with rash onset on December 28. The
only notable travel history during the exposure period was a visit to one of
two adjacent Disney theme parks located in Orange County, California. On
the same day, CDPH received reports of four additional suspected measles
cases in California residents and two in Utah residents, all of whom reported
visiting one or both Disney theme parks during December 17–20. By
January 7, seven California measles cases had been confirmed, and CDPH
issued a press release and an Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X)
notification to other states regarding this outbreak.37

News outlets blamed the outbreak on anti-vaccine activism, with news
articles declaring that “[t]his looks like another artifact of the rise of the antivaccination movement.”38 Headlines included “Disneyland: The Latest
Victim of the Anti-Vaxxers”39 and “Disneyland measles outbreak sheds light
on anti-vaccine movement.”40 Concern was high in California as cases
increased. A study published in March pointed out that “substandard
vaccination compliance is likely to blame for the 2015 measles outbreak. Our
study estimates that MMR vaccination rates among the exposed population
in which secondary cases have occurred might be as low as 50% and likely

36

37

38

39
40

Measles—The Americas, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.who.int/csr/don/13february-2015-measles/en/. The outbreak made California an exporter not just of computers,
electronic commodities, and other goods, but of measles. Trade Statistics, CALCHAMBER
ADVOCACY (2017), https://advocacy.calchamber.com/international/trade/trade-statistics/.
Jennifer Zipprich et al., Measles Outbreak—California, December 2014–February 2015, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Feb. 20, 2015),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6406a5.htm?s_cid=mm6406a5_w.
Michael Hiltzik, Anti-Vaccination Update: How the Measles Crisis Struck Disneyland, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8,
2015, 9:26 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-antivaccination-update-themeasles-crisis-strikes-disneyland-20150108-column.html.
Jeffrey
Kluger,
Disneyland:
The
Latest
Victim
of
the
Anti-Vaxxers,
TIME,
http://time.com/3664553/disneyland-measles-antivaxxers/ (last updated Jan. 23, 2015).
Marisa Taylor, Disneyland Measles Outbreak Sheds Light on Anti-Vaccine Movement, AL JAZEERA AMERICA
(Jan. 23, 2015, 12:14 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/23/measlesdisneyland-anti-vaccine.html.
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no higher than 86%.”41
The emphasis on non-vaccination as a cause of the outbreak drew
attention to the problem of the high exemption rates in some California
communities. While the emphasis in the media was on the Disneyland
outbreak, this was the second year in a row that California saw relatively high
rates of measles. Although the largest outbreak in 2014 was not in California,
but in an Amish community with low immunization rates in Ohio,42
California’s 2014 outbreak led to the highest number of cases in the state
since 1995.43 In this relatively large measles outbreak 22 out of more than
60 cases occurred in Orange County (where Disneyland is located), an area
that therefore saw two unusually large outbreaks of measles in two
consecutive years.44
B. Legislative Result
While some of the lawsuits tried to present SB277 as the result of
pharmaceutical companies’ influence alone, the broad support behind it, and
the events leading to it, do not support such an interpretation. This was not
a law that was created by one person, nor was it passed without going
through the normal legislative process.
After calls from constituents, a coalition of legislators which included
Senator and pediatrician Richard Pan, Senator Ben Allen, and
Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzales, formed to put the legislation together.45
They were supported by a group of parent activists with different
backgrounds who formed an organization called Vaccinate California that
co-sponsored the bill.46 The proposed SB277 went through three legislative
committees in the California Senate—the Senate’s Health Committee,
Education Committee, and Judiciary Committee—before heading to the
41
42
43

44

45

46

Majumder et al., supra note 31 at 494.
Paul A. Gastañaduy et al., A Measles Outbreak in an Underimmunized Amish Community in Ohio, 375 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1344, 1344 (2016).
Zipprich et al., Notes from the Field: Measles Outbreak—California, January 1–April 18, 2014, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Apr. 25, 2014),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6316a6.htm.
Eryn Brown, CDC: 2014 A Record Year for Measles, California Has 60 Cases, L.A. TIMES (May 29, 2014,
6:16 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-measles-california-cdc-20140529story.html.
Jeremy B. White, From Death Threats to Holocaust Warning, California Vaccine Bill an Extraordinary Fight,
SACRAMENTO BEE (June 30, 2015, 5:01 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/capitol-alert/article25909216.html (last updated June 30, 2015, 11:01 PM).
Hannah Henry, And Then Immunity Won the Day, MOTHERTHINK (July 3, 2015),
http://www.motherthink.com/2015/07/03/and-then-immunity-won-the-day/.
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floor for a vote.47 It passed the Senate, went through the Assembly’s Health
Committee, passed the Assembly, and was signed by California’s
Governor—going through a full deliberative process.48
In each Committee hearing, both sides presented testimony,49 and in
each hearing, several hundreds of people opposed to at least some vaccines
filled the meeting chamber, many of them families with children in tow,
attending to oppose the legislation.50 While opposition was intense, it is
important to remember opponents represent a very small, if vocal, minority
in California.51 On the other side, the bill was co-sponsored by the parents’
organization, Vaccinate California, which coordinated letters of support
from all California’s counties, spoke up for the bill in different forums, and
supported the bill on social media.52 It also received written support from
the California Parents-Teachers Association53 and several school boards.54.
Opponents had multiple chances to present their objections and convince
legislators, and made full use of them, with phone calls, letters, and extensive
social media advocacy. Most legislators, however, ended up supporting the
law, which passed with large majorities. The final vote was 24 supporting to
14 opposing in the Senate, with two not voting, and 46 to 31 in the Assembly,

47
48
49
50

51

52
53
54

Vote
Totals,
S.B.
277,
2014–15
S.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Cal.
2015),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB277.
Id.
For full disclosure, I was one of the witnesses testifying before the Judiciary Committee. Notes from
my testimony are on file with Author, to be shared on request.
Tracy Seipel, Vaccine Exemptions: California SB277 Against Opt-Outs Advances in 6-2 Senate Health
Committee, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015, 7:51 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2015/04/
08/vaccine-exemptions-california-sb277-against-opt-outs-advances-in-6-2-senate-healthcommittee-vote/ (last updated Aug. 12, 2016, 4:47 AM).
Robin Abcarian, California Vaccine Law Opponents: Passionate, Persistent, and Science-averse, L.A. TIMES
(June 29, 2015, 4:17 PM) http://www.latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-me-ra-vaccine-opponentspersistent-20150629-column.html; Jennifer Medina, California Set to Mandate Childhooe Vaccines Amid
Intense Fight, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/us/californiavaccines-religious-and-personal-exemptions.html.
SB277 Becomes Law, VACCINATECALIFORNIA BLOG (July 1, 2015), http://vaccinatecalifornia.org/
2015/07/01/sb277-becomes-law/.
Health Care and Immunizations, CALIFORNIA STATE PTA, http://capta.org/focus-areas/healthsafety/health-care-and-immunizations/.
See, e.g., Noel Brinkerhoff, School Board Approves New Immunization Policy, NAPA VALLEY REG. (Feb. 5,
2016),
http://napavalleyregister.com/news/local/school-board-approves-new-immunizationpolicy/Article_ba454325-0ac4-5b2c-b240-007a95d6e631.html (illustrating an example of a school
board demonstrating support for vaccination requirements); see also Briefs: Piedmont School Board
Supports State’s Vaccination Bill, MERCURY NEWS (June 17, 2015, 11:22 AM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/2015/06/17/briefs-piedmont-school-board-supports-statesvaccination-bill (illustrating an additional example of a school board demonstrating support for
vaccination requirements).
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with three not voting.55 Governor Jerry Brown signed the bill the day after
the assembly vote,56 with a strong signing statement that said, among other
things:
The science is clear that vaccines dramatically protect children against a
number of infectious and dangerous diseases. While it’s true that no medical
intervention is without risk, the evidence shows that immunization
powerfully benefits and protects the community.57

Opponents were not willing to give up. They mobilized to place the issue
directly before California’s voters by putting a referendum about it on the
ballot. However, they failed to gather the required number of signatures to
put it on the ballot (five percent of the votes cast for the Governor at the last
election),58 falling far below the minimum required.59 They tried to recall
the lead author of the bill, pediatrician and Senator Richard Pan, but they
failed to submit any signatures supporting their recall effort.60
They also turned to the courts, asking courts to overturn the law.

55
56

57
58
59

60

Vote Totals, S.B. 277, 2014–15 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB277.
Tracy Seipel & Jessica Calefati, California Vaccine Bill SB 277 Signed into Law by Jerry Brown, MERCURY
NEWS, http://www.mercurynews.com/2015/06/30/california-vaccine-bill-sb-277-signed-intolaw-by-jerry-brown/ (last updated Aug. 12, 2016, 1:53 AM).
Signing Statement of Edmund G. Brown Jr., Office of the Governor, Assemb. B. 2109, 2011–12
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
Alex
Padilla,
Referendum,
CALIFORNIA
SECRETARY
OF
STATE
(2018),
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/referendum/.
Jeremy B. White, California Vaccine Referendum Falls Short in Internal Count, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept.
30,
2015,
8:08
PM),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitolalert/Article37144386.html (last updated Oct. 1, 2015, 8:38 AM).
Jeremy B. White, Richard Pan Recall Effort Falls Short on Vaccine Issue, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 4, 2016,
9:25 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/Article52931130.html
(last updated Feb. 2016, 4:28 PM). This is notably not a mistake; they submitted “[n]ot a single
signature.” Id.
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III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO SB277
August 2016 was a tense month in California’s vaccine wars. The first
case against the new immunization law, SB277, was filed with a federal judge
in San Diego. On August 12, 2016, I attended a hearing conducted by Judge
Dana M. Sabraw to decide whether to grant a preliminary injunction in a
suit filed by seventeen different plaintiffs and four organizations against the
new law.61 The law removed California’s Personal Belief Exemption from
school immunization requirements.62 The plaintiffs, all unwilling to fully
vaccinate their children against the ten diseases the law required they be
protected from before attending school, believed they had no choice but to
keep their children out of school in the wake of the law. The stakes, from
their point of view, were very high. Their supporters—mostly anti-vaccine
activists, including people from out-of-state—also saw the stakes as high,
concerned about the precedent SB277 could set for other states if not struck
down. A long line of opponents of the act attended the hearing; to my
knowledge, I was the only person there not in opposition to SB277, aside
from the state attorneys. I had at that point been advocating for vaccines for
over four years and was involved in supporting the law during the legislative
process, including testifying before the judiciary committee on the legal
aspects of school immunization mandates, explaining why the proposed law
was constitutional under existing jurisprudence.
The Judge asked a lot of questions during the hearing, but his demeanor
let neither party know where he stood. We all had to wait for two weeks for
the decision. Until 2016, no court—state or federal—had struck down a
school immunization mandate, and a long line of cases upheld them. But
the plaintiffs’ lawyers worked hard to convince the judge that California’s
SB277 should be struck down, that this time a state went too far in requiring
immunizations for school, that the requirement was too stringent. However,
their efforts were unsuccessful. Judge Sabraw’s decision to reject their
request for a preliminary injunction made it clear he thought their chances
of success on the merits were low, and they decided to withdraw the lawsuit.63
61
62

63

For details on the questions asked and the arguments made at the hearing, see Transcript of Motion
Hearing, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01715).
The law amended California’s Public Health and Safety code to repeal section 120365, which
allowed parents to exempt their children from the school immunization requirements if those
conflicted with their personal beliefs. S.B. 277, 2014–15 S., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Cal. 2015).
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice at 1, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01715); see also Dennis F. Hernandez, Health First, L.A
LAWYER, June 2018, at 31 (noting the willingness of the court in Whitlow to limit an individual’s
right to practice religion freely when that individual right endangers the health of the community).
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This lawsuit was the first of several lawsuits attacking SB277. So far, five
lawsuits have been filed against SB277 (One is a lawsuit initially filed in
federal court, rejected, and refiled in state court by the same group).64 Three
of them were professionally written, thoughtfully (if not very convincingly, as
explained) argued.65 One, filed by a lawyer, did not clearly make its claims
and ended with the demurrer against it sustained, and a strong court of
appeals decision against it.66 The last lawsuit was filed by a number of prose litigants, and its arguments were the least plausible.67 All five have been
rejected by the trial courts. Two were appealed; for one, a panel of the Court
of Appeal for the Second Appellate District soundly rejected the appeal, and
the other is still open.68 The rejection in each case drew, in part, on Judge
Sabraw’s initial, carefully reasoned decision to reject the motion for
preliminary injunction.
This Article assumes that these lawsuits represent the best efforts of
SB277 opponents. I will use them to overcome my natural bias, as a
supporter of the legislation. As Part I sets out, school immunization
mandates draw on extensive data that shows that vaccines are safe (their risks
are small, and the risks of not vaccinating are much greater), that high rates
of vaccination reduce outbreaks, and thus strong school mandates increase
rates of vaccination and reduce outbreaks. These facts led courts in the
United States to largely uphold states’ choices in relation to school

64
65

66

67

68

Table 1, in Appendix, describes the lawsuit in more detail, including the lawyers (to highlight that
one had unrepresented plaintiffs).
See generally Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d
1079 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01715); Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other
Relief, Torrey Love v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No. SCV0039311 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2017)
[hereinafter Torrey Love Complaint]. Torrey Love is actually two lawsuits, one filed in federal court and
the other in state court, hence there were three professionally written complaints. The state version of
Torrey Love is currently under appeal in the California Court of Appeal. Torrey Love, No. SCV0039311
(Cal. Super Ct. Nov. 2, 2017), appeal docketed, No. C086030 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2017).
See Order of Dismissal, Buck v. California, No. BC617766 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 2017). In
October 2017, during the appeal, two of the plaintiffs, including Tamara Buck, the initial lead,
withdrew from the lawsuit. It then became Brown v. Smith on appeal. See Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal.
App. 5th 1135, 1143 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). However, since the initial court decision rejecting the
lawsuit was still Buck, and since the lawsuit drew heavily (and wrongly) on Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), I will continue to refer to it as Buck for the purpose of this Article in order to avoid
confusion. Buck was the first lawsuit, filed in April 2016, but because its arguments are relatively
weak it will get less emphasis in this Article.
Report & Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge, Middleton v. Pan, 2017 WL 7053936 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 15, 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-05224-SVW-AGR). The district judge adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation to dismiss the lawsuit. See Middleton v. Pan, No. 2:16-cv-05224-SVW-AGR,
2018 WL 582324 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-55268 (9th Cir. June 27, 2018).
See Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
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mandates.69 Opponents had to challenge both the factual basis behind the
mandates and the existing jurisprudence. Because the bulk of the Article
focuses on the legal arguments raised to challenge the jurisprudence, this
section—seeking to present the basic principles and framework within which
the lawsuits had to operate—starts with opponents’ efforts to challenge the
factual premises behind SB277, before continuing with the longstanding
jurisprudence upholding immunization mandates and the basic principles
behind them. Part IV, then, deals with opponents’ legal arguments for
moving away from this jurisprudence.
A. Reframing the Facts
One of the reasons legislatures pass mandates and courts uphold them is
that abundant evidence supports the claim that such mandates prevent
diseases, and, in doing so, protect children and the community.70 One way
to fight against mandates is to try and challenge that evidence. SB277
opponents challenged the descriptions I provided above in three major ways
(not necessarily in the order I present them). First, they challenged tightening
school mandates in California as unnecessary, by claiming that at
California’s rate of exemptions, unvaccinated children do not pose a risk to
other children. Second, they challenged the role of the measles outbreak in
triggering SB277, claiming there was no public health emergency justifying
the bill even in relation to vaccination against measles, and certainly in
relation to the other vaccines cover by California’s immunization mandate.
Finally, they claimed that vaccines were neither safe nor necessary,
challenging the science on vaccines.
These claims are repeated across the lawsuits, and this Article will only
provide the strongest examples for each.

69

70

State jurisprudence serves as an exception, setting limits on the ways states enforce religious
exemptions to school mandates. See Reiss, supra note 4, at 1558–70 (discussing religious exemptions
to school mandates in practice by the states).
See infra Part I.
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1. School Mandates and Necessity
In Whitlow v. California, the plaintiffs claimed that the number of children
with non-medical exemptions in California prior to the law was too low to
affect public health, and that treating unvaccinated children as disease
carriers is unfair and unjustified. The lawsuit stated that:
California did not have “escalating numbers of unvaccinated children”
when SB 277 was introduced. As CDPH reports show, prior to SB 277’s
introduction and enactment, kindergarten PBE [personal belief exemption]
rates had dropped 19%, from an already low 3.15% in 2013–14 to 2.54%
in 2014–15. Rates fell another 7% in 2015–16, to 2.38%. In fact, at SB
277’s introduction, California’s vaccination rate was “at or near all-time
high levels.”
Defendants characterize Plaintiffs’ children—all of whom are selectively
vaccinated, none of whom carry any illnesses, and some of whom have
laboratory-confirmed immunity—as “unvaccinated” carriers of “potentially
fatal diseases.” Defendants do not explain how Plaintiffs’ healthy children
are a “danger to public health” or how their exclusion from school “protects
the public.”71

This description understates the issue on two fronts. First, it ignores the
trend of rising exemptions. Between 1996 and 2010, California’s exemption
rate increased 380%, from 0.5% to 2.3%.72 While the total number of
exemptions in the state never rose above three percent, the exemption rate
was not evenly distributed: some areas and some schools had much higher
rates of PBEs than others, making them potential hot spots for outbreaks.73
Second, the complaint understates the risk from unvaccinated children,
individually and in aggregate. Unvaccinated children are at higher risk of
getting a preventable disease, and at higher risk of transmitting it.74 Several
outbreaks in the United States were directly traced to an unvaccinated child

71

72

73

74

Plaintiffs’ Reply to State Defendant Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3–4,
Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01715-DMS-BGS)
(internal citations omitted).
See Malia Jones & Alison Buttenheim, Potential Effects of California’s New Vaccine Exemption Law on the
Prevalence and Clustering of Exemptions, 104(9) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 3 (2014) (discussing California
exemption rates and the effect of policy change on vaccine refusal trends).
See Elaine Won, Protecting Our Children: The California Public School Vaccination Mandate Debate, 10 CAL.
LEGAL HIST. 471, 477–79 (2015) (discussing studies that report higher exemption rates among
wealthier populations in California).
See, e.g., Feikin et al., supra note 26, at 3145 (finding that vaccine “[e]xemptors were 22.2 times . . .
more likely to acquire measles and 5.9 times . . . more likely to acquire pertussis than vaccinated
children”); Jason M. Glanz et al., Parental Refusal of Pertussis Vaccination is Associated with an Increased
Risk of Pertussis Infection in Children, 123 PEDIATRICS 1446, 1447, 1449 (2009) (detailing studies
demonstrating increased risks of contracting infectious diseases for unvaccinated children).
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coming back from abroad with a preventable disease.75 When unvaccinated
children congregate, another risk arises, the risk of undermining herd
immunity. High rates of exemptions mean rates of vaccination have gone
down—and it is therefore unsurprising that studies repeatedly found that
areas with high rates of exemptions were more vulnerable to outbreaks.76 So
the simple reality is that unvaccinated children create a risk of disease to
others, a risk much higher than the one created by their vaccinated,
protected peers, and when they congregate—for example, when a
community leans towards non-vaccination—there is a larger risk of disease.
That was exactly the situation in California before the outbreak, where
although the overall rate of immunization was high, some counties had very
low rates, and it contributed to the Disneyland outbreak.77
2. The Measles Outbreak as an Impetus to SB277
Several lawsuits claimed that the measles outbreak did not justify the
passage of SB277. For example, the plaintiff’s in Whitlow stated that:
What the State ignores is that both outbreaks began with foreign-imported
measles and ended with relatively few people affected. Despite originating
from a foreign visitor in one of the most populous places in the state, where
more than 60,000 people were potentially exposed, the Disneyland outbreak
affected a total of 136 Californians and was quickly contained. Defendants
present no evidence that Disneyland, or any outbreak, would have been any
different if children with PBEs had been permanently barred from school.
Moreover, if anything, the Disneyland outbreak shows that even when many
thousands are exposed to measles, very few become infected, belying Dr.
Schechter’s speculation that California is on the verge of a pandemic so
imminent that draconian actions, like repealing PBEs or permanently

75

76

77

See David E. Sugerman et al., Measles Outbreak in a Highly Vaccinated Population, San Diego, 2008: Role
of the Intentionally Undervaccinated, 125 PEDIATRICS 747, 747 (2010) (investigating the large outbreak
of measles in San Diego, California following the return of an unvaccinated, infected child traveling
from Switzerland). See generally Amy A. Parker et al., Implications of a 2005 Measles Outbreak in Indiana
for Sustained Elimination of Measles in the United States, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 447 (2006); Maggie Fox,
Measles Outbreak in Minnesota Caused by Vaccine Skeptics, NBC (May 8, 2017, 12:43 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/measles-outbreak-minnesota-caused-vaccineskeptics-n756246 (last updated May 9, 2017, 3:13 PM) (detailing measles outbreaks in Indiana and
Minnesota during 2005 and 2017, respectively).
Feikin et al., supra note 26, at 3145; see also Aamer Imdad et al., Religious Exemptions for Immunization
and Risk of Pertussis in New York State, 2000–2011, 132 PEDIATRICS 37, 40, 42 (2013) (indicating a
positive correlation between areas of high exemption rates and prevalence of pertussis in the state
of New York); Omer supra note 30, at 1394 (discussing evidence for an increased risk of vaccinepreventable diseases in areas with geographic “clusters” of exemptors).
See Majumder et al., supra note 31, at 494 (indicating substandard vaccination compliance was likely
to blame for the 2015 outbreak of measles at Disneyland Resort).
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isolating healthy schoolchildren is necessary.78

While the Disneyland outbreak was relatively limited, this claim ignores two
things. While compared to the population of California, the outbreak was
limited in scope (not surprising, when most people are vaccinated), it was the
largest outbreak in the state since the 1990s, dramatically higher than what
should happen when vaccination rates are high enough, and it was
concentrated in areas with low rates of vaccination. Second, the outbreak
was quickly contained through extensive work by the California Health
Department, work that was costly and time-consuming: the costs were in the
millions. 79 Further, the response to the outbreak involved quarantining tens
of people.80 In other words, though outbreaks caused by non-vaccination
can be contained, containment efforts at best cost money that the state
cannot spend on other important health issues, and at worst, fail to prevent
deaths and harms. 81 Containment also involves limiting the liberty of people
exposed to the disease. At worst the measles outbreak would cost lives and
permanent disabilities.82

78
79

80

81

82

Plaintiffs’ Reply to State Defendant Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note
71, at 6.
Kathleen Harriman, 2014–2015 Measles Outbreak: It’s a Small World After All, CAL. DEP’T PUB.
HEALTH (June 9, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/nvpo/nvac/meetings/
pastmeetings/2015/2014-2015_california_measles_outbreak.pdf (referencing the $1.56–$3.91
million in estimated public health cost in California from this outbreak). That kind of cost is not
unusual for measles outbreaks. See generally Tara Haelle, Measles Outbreaks in Dollars and Cents: It Costs
Taxpayers Bigtime, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2015, 7:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tarahaelle/
2015/02/11/measles-outbreak-in-dollars-and-cents-it-costs-taxpayers-bigtime/#1dcd12fb3f63
(discussing the expensive economic costs that follow measles outbreaks).
To give a few examples, fourteen infants in a daycare in Santa Monica were quarantined during
the outbreak. Brittny Mejia & Matt Hamilton, Measles: State Totals Rise by One Case, But No Slowdown
in the Outbreak, L.A. Times (February 2, 2015, 9:01 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-santa-monica-baby-measles-20150202-story.html. Unvaccinated high school students were
kept home. Rebecca Plevin & Adrian Florido, Disneyland Measles Tally Rises, Unvaccinated OC
Highschool Students Kept Home, SCPR (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.scpr.org/news/2015/01/
16/49326/amid-measles-outbreak-oc-high-school-makes-unvacci/.
See generally Charlotte A. Moser et al., Funding the Costs of Disease Outbreaks Caused by Non--Vaccination,
J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 633–36, 643, 647 (2015) (discussing the costs the government must pay in
response to vaccine-preventable disease outbreaks).
Europe, where low vaccination rates led to high rates of measles in the past few years, has seen tens
of deaths, including in France, Italy, and Portugal, and thousands of hospitalizations. Measles Cases
Hit Record High in the European Region, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Aug. 20, 2018),
http://www.euro.who.int/en/media-centre/sections/press-releases/2018/measles-cases-hitrecord-high-in-the-european-region. In the first six months of 2018 Europe saw 41,000 measles
cases and thirty-seven people died. To take Italy as an example, in 2017 over forty percent of
patients were hospitalized. Measles in Italy: Weekly Bulleting, EPICENTRO (Nov. 4 2017),
http://www.epicentro.iss.it/problemi/morbillo/bollettino/Measles_WeeklyReport_N33eng.pdf
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3. Vaccines Risks and Benefits
At least three of the cases tried to challenge the scientific consensus that
vaccines risks are small and their benefits large, with different degrees of
competence. These make a large part of the lawsuits, and I will only address
some of these claims. The plaintiffs in Torrey-Love, for example, asserted that
the vaccines required are not necessary, making some incorrect assertions,83
like the claim that Hepatitis B is almost always sexually transmitted,84 or the
claim that tetanus (a disease with ten percent mortality and almost always a
long, painful recovery)85 is “very rarely” dangerous to the individual.86 The
complaint generally downplayed the risk from vaccine-preventable diseases.
More extremely, the plaintiffs in Buck v. Smith claimed that vaccines do
not provide immunity, that their immunity is short-lived (“only a few weeks
(if at all)”),87 and that there are real alternatives to mandates: parents may
use “non-allopathic” means of immunity (the complaint does not specify
what those would be),88 or the state may quarantine the sick. The complaint
argues that:
Natural immunity comes with no risk of harmful side effect; by contrast, all
vaccines come with dozens of harmful side-effects, e.g. asthma, allergies,
autism, autoimmune issues, encephalitis, paralysis, and death, (which are
listed on lengthy vaccine inserts).89

It is simply incorrect to claim that diseases like diphtheria, polio, and
hepatitis B, that would have to be contracted (and survived) for a person to
83
84

85

86
87
88

89

Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 12.
For adults, the main route is sexual. For children, other routes exist, and the epidemiology is often
unknown. See W. Ray Kim, Epidemiology of Hepatitis B in the United States, 49 HEPATOLOGY 28, 28–
34 (2009) (discussing the differences between children and adults in routes of hepatitis B
transmissions). Before the vaccine, about 16,000 children under the age of ten were infected each
year, about half through infected mothers, the rest through other routes. In other words, the
implication that this is mostly a sexually transmitted disease that is not a risk for children is incorrect.
See Gregory L. Armstrong et al., Childhood Hepatitis B Virus Infections in the United States before Hepatitis
B Immunization, 108 PEDIATRICS 1123, 1123 (2001) (finding thousands of American children were
infected by hepatitis B each year before routine HPV immunization). When a child gets hepatitis
B, the risk of chronic infection that can lead to liver disease and cancer is much, much higher. Id.
Epidemiology and Prevention of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION
(Sept.
8,
2015),
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/
tetanus.html#complications (defining and describing the tetanus disease and its characteristics).
Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 12.
Second Amended Complaint, at 6, Buck v. Smith, No. 2:16-cv-05111-GHK-MRW (C.D. Cal July
21, 2016) [hereinafter Buck Complaint].
Allopathic is a term those who prefer alternative medicine over traditional, science-based medicine
use to refer to traditional medicine. Allopathy, THEFREEDICTIONARY: MEDICAL DICTIONARY
(accessed Sept. 18, 2018), http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/allopathy.
Buck Complaint, supra note 87, at 6.
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have natural immunity, come with no risk of harmful side effects. To use
two of the examples in Buck, encephalitis is one of the risks of measles,90 and
paralysis one of the risks of polio.91 In fact, without vaccines, the diseases in
question are estimated to cause tens of thousands of deaths and millions of
cases of illness in a single birth cohort.92
The Middleton v. Pan suit had an even more extreme set of factual claims.
The whole basis for the complaint is that SB277 is a conspiracy to harm
children, based on a belief that vaccines are extremely dangerous.93 One
claim used to make that point is an emphasis on vaccine ingredients, a
common anti-vaccine trope; while the ingredients may sound frightening to
people without scientific background (like most of us), in the tiny amounts
found in vaccines they are not, in fact, harmful.94 To give one example, the
plaintiffs express concerns about aluminum salts used in vaccines. Aluminum
salts have been used as adjuvants in vaccines since the 1920s, and have an
excellent safety record.95 Plaintiffs disagree. But the sources they use to
address this are the FDA’s limits for intravenous feeding of infants—daylong
provision of solution directly into an infant’s vein—and articles about the risks
from such IV feeding of premature babies.96 That is very different from
vaccines, injected into the muscle—not directly into a vein—once every few
months.97 Because of this distinction, it is not a good counter to sources that
are actually on point. The FDA does have limits for vaccines, and the
schedule does not exceed them. 98 Further, the FDA studied the safety of
90
91
92
93
94

95

96
97

98

Walter A. Orenstein, Robert T. Perry & Neal Halsey, The Clinical Significance of Measles: A Review,
189 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 4, 7–8 (2004).
Epidemiology and Prevention of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Apr. 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/downloads/polio.pdf.
Fangjun Zhou et al., Economic Evaluation of the Routine Childhood Immunization Program in the United States,
2009, 133 PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2014).
Complaint at 4–5, Middleton v. Pan, 2017 WL 7053936 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2016) (No. 2:16-cv05224-SVW-AGR) [hereinafter Middleton Complaint].
Paul A. Offit & Rita K. Jew, Special Article, Addressing Parents’ Concerns: Do Vaccines Contain Harmful
Preservatives, Adjuvants, Additives, or Residuals?, 112 PEDIATRICS 1 (2003); see also Reiss & Weithorn,
supra note 21, at 944–45.
Bruno Guy, The Perfect Mix: Recent Progress in Adjuvant Research, 5 NATURE REVS. MICROBIOLOGY
505, 514 (2007); Philippa Marrack et al., Towards an Understanding of the Adjuvant Action of Aluminium,
9(4) NAT. REV. IMMUNOLOGY 287, 293 (2009).
Middleton Complaint, supra note 93, at 7.
On the differences between intravenous and intramuscular routes for this purpose, as well as the
absorption and effect, see Robert J. Mitkus et al., Updated Aluminum Pharmacokinetics Following Infant
Exposures Through Diet and Vaccination, 29 VACCINE 9538, 9541 (2011) and Tammy Z. Movsas et al.,
Effect of Routine Vaccination on Aluminum and Essential Element Levels in Preterm Infants, 167 [J]AMA
PEDIATRICS 870, 871 (2013).
See 21 C.F.R. § 610.15 (2017) (prescribing limits to the amount of ingredients, preservatives, diluents,
and adjuvants allowed in vaccines, including aluminum content); see also Offit & Jew, supra note 94;
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aluminum salts used in the infant vaccine schedule and found them safe.99
Similarly, the complaint’s discussion of formaldehyde—another
ingredient it highlights—ignores the fact that, aside from its presence in
many fruits, formaldehyde is created by the human body as part of our
metabolism.100 It is already present in infants’ blood in much, much higher
amounts than those in vaccines.101
In short, several of the lawsuits attempt to challenge the scientific
consensus on vaccines, but the arguments used are extremely problematic,
with little use of expert sources or evidence of expertise.
B. Basic Principles
The biggest challenge facing the plaintiffs in any of these lawsuits—and
any other across the United States—is that a jurisprudence founded on
strong basic principles has consistently upheld vaccine mandates at both the
state and federal level.
Judge Sabraw, ruling in Whitlow, explained that: “For more than 100
years, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the right of the States to
enact and enforce laws requiring citizens to be vaccinated.”102
In the following paragraphs I will emphasize three basic principles that
support immunization mandates. First, for over a century—and possibly
dating back to the beginning of the Republic—public health has been a core
state function, an area where states had acknowledged powers and
responsibility. Second, while individual liberties are important, our
jurisprudence has always acknowledged that individual liberty can be limited
to protect the public health—indeed, that without that society cannot exist.
Third, school mandates occupy a special sphere in which state power to
regulate is especially strong: they are justified by both public health and
protection of children’s health, two powerful interests, and conversely,
because the core individual right they affect—parental freedom to make
decisions for their children—runs against both the child’s welfare and the
welfare of those outside the family, it is at its weakest there.

99
100
101
102

Vaccine Ingredients—Aluminum, CHILD. HOSP. PHILA. (2018), http://www.chop.edu/centersprograms/vaccine-education-center/vaccine-ingredients/aluminum.
Robert J. Mitkus et al., Updated Aluminum Pharmacokinetics Following Infant Exposures Through Diet and
Vaccination, 29 VACCINE 9538, 9542–43 (2011).
Robert J. Mitkus et al., Pharmacokinetic Modeling as an Approach to Assessing the Safety of Residual
Formaldehyde in Infant Vaccines, 31 VACCINE 2738 (2013).
Offit & Jew, supra note 94.
Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1083 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
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While the states’ police power is not well defined, courts have clearly and
consistently ruled (at least since the nineteenth century) that it encompasses
a state’s power to regulate for the public health.103 In 1905, in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court upheld a statute requiring
vaccination against smallpox on those grounds. The Court, addressing the
tension between public health and individual rights, stated that:
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily
subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could
not exist with safety to its members. . . . Real liberty for all could not exist
under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each
individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his
property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.104

Jacobson clearly acknowledged that the ability of states to limit individual
rights were not absolute—it explained that:
[I]t might be that an acknowledged power of a local community to protect
itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all, might be exercised in
particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an
arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was
reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel
the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.105

However, the authority in Jacobson clearly allowed states to put in place
reasonable regulations limiting personal freedom, and it is clearly
acknowledged today that states have authority to use quarantine powers,
which directly interfere in civil liberties,106 to mandate seatbelts,107 and other
public health intervention in personal behavior like smoking bans and drinking
while driving.108 It is clear today that individual liberties can be limited for
public health purposes—though the states’ authority to do so has limits, too.109

103
104
105
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See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1872) (recognizing for the first time that the police power
allows states to regulate for the public’s wellbeing).
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
Id. at 28 (citing Wis., Minn., & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287, 301 (1900)).
Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New Century Part II: Public Health Powers and Limits, 283
[J]AMA 2979, 2980 (2000).
Jeffrey L. Thomas, The Freedom to Be Foolish? L.B. 496: The Mandatory Seatbelt Law, 19 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 743, 748 (1986) (“[T]here are few reported cases in which the constitutionality of
mandatory seat belt laws has been challenged.”).
George A. Mensah et al., Law as a Tool for Preventing Chronic Diseases: Expanding the Spectrum of Effective
Public Health Strategies, 1 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASES 1, 3 (2004).
Gostin, supra note 106, at 2980–82.
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There is every reason to think a mandate with no non-medical
exemption—like the one embodied in SB277—is well within the reasonable
limits of state police powers. In a recent article, Professor Lois Weithorn and
I addressed the fact that Jacobson is still correct and applicable when it comes
to children’s immunization (but may be challenged on several grounds when
attempting to criminalize adult refusal to be immunized).110 In relation to
childhood vaccines, limiting parents’ liberty is supported by both the child’s
interest to be free from disease—an interest the state can legitimately protect
—and the public health.111 It is important to remember what parents are
demanding when they challenge school mandates. The parents in question
do not only claim the freedom to reject a global expert consensus that
vaccines’ risks are small, and smaller than their benefits, and leave their child
at risk of preventable diseases. They also claim the freedom to create a risk
of outbreak in the school, an outbreak that would affect other children and
the community in general, by sending their children to school unvaccinated.
Our courts have not been sympathetic to that demand.
In 1922, relying on Jacobson, the Supreme Court upheld a city ordinance
requiring that children be vaccinated before attending schools (public and
private), an ordinance with no exemption.112 The Zucht v. King Court rejected
both a due process and an equal protection challenge to the ordinance.113
While the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the constitutionality
of vaccine mandates since, in obiter dictum in Prince v. Massachusetts,114 the
Court made the strong statement that:
[A parent] cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child
more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.115

No court, state or federal, has ever struck down an immunization
mandate, and many have upheld them. Most recently, two circuit courts of
appeals rejected such challenges. In Workman v. Mingo County Board of
Education, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to West
Virginia’s school immunization mandate, which does not have a nonmedical exemption—and rejected it, finding the mandate constitutional.116
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 895–915.
Id.
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922).
Id. at 176.
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Id. at 166–67.
419 F. App’x 348, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2011).
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Similarly, in Phillips v. City of New York,117 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected a challenge to New York’s immunization mandate.
SB277 challengers faced a formidable background: a strong
jurisprudence supporting vaccine mandates, solidly grounded in the
important interests they protect: child’s health and the community’s health.
SB277 opponents tried to counter the jurisprudence by reframing the facts,
by attempting to distinguish the jurisprudence from modern reality, or by
downplaying the jurisprudence and instead reaching for other legal
arguments. However, challenges to SB277 cannot and should not win
without providing a strong basis—factual and legal—for deviating from the
jurisprudence, and so far, the cases have not.
Relevant to this section, three of the lawsuits—Whitlow, Torrey-Love, and
Buck—also tried to distinguish the cases. In Whitlow, the plaintiffs’ attorneys
raised several arguments in attempts to distinguish from previous
jurisprudence. For example, during the preliminary hearing118 Attorney
Turner, speaking for the plaintiffs, suggested that the court in Zucht “did not
reach the constitutional issues.” But that is incorrect. What the Zucht Court
actually said was:
But, although the validity of a law was formally drawn in question, it is our
duty to decline jurisdiction whenever it appears that the constitutional
question presented is not, and was not at the time of granting the writ,
substantial in character. Long before this suit was instituted, Jacobson v.
Massachusetts had settled that it is within the police power of a state to provide
for compulsory vaccination. That case and others had also settled that a
state may, consistently with the federal Constitution, delegate to a
municipality authority to determine under what conditions health
regulations shall become operative.119

In other words, the court declared that the constitutional issues were
decided and clear, and in essence, reaffirmed that previous jurisprudence and
its constitutional findings.
In the hearing mentioned above, Attorney Rosenberg attempted to
distinguish Phillips by pointing out—correctly—that New York has a
religious exemption, and that two of the cases in Phillips were catholic parents
that had an exemption but whose children were kept out of school during an
outbreak.120 This is a correct depiction of the circumstances that brought
117
118
119
120

775 F.3d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (upholding New York state requirement that students
be vaccinated in order to attend public school).
Transcript of Motion Hearing at 13, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (S.D. Cal. 2016)
(No. 16CV1715-DMS).
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (internal citations omitted) (citing Sugarman v. United
States, 249 U.S. 182, 184 (1919)).
Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 118, at 28.
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two of the plaintiffs to court (the third was denied a religious exemption), but
it is not the legal question the court addressed, or apparently, the plaintiffs
pleaded. Phillips opens by saying:
Plaintiffs brought this action challenging on constitutional grounds New
York State’s requirement that all children be vaccinated in order to attend
public school. Plaintiffs argued that the statutory vaccination requirement,
which is subject to medical and religious exemptions, violates their
substantive due process rights, the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Ninth Amendment, and both state and municipal law.121

In other words, while the scenario that brought two of the plaintiffs to
court was different than the one facing SB277 plaintiffs (the third situation
was a more direct parallel, a child refused admission unless vaccinated), the
argument was the same—and the decision directly relevant.122
Similarly, Attorney Rosenberg for the plaintiffs suggested Workman did
not address the educational issue at focus here123—but while she’s right that
a state’s constitutional right to education was not discussed in Workman, other
claims raised by the plaintiffs were.
Torrey-Love made a more systematic effort to distinguish past precedent.
In its request for preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs’ complaint made a
number of points. First, they pointed to the fact that Jacobson was cited in
Buck v. Bell,124 in which the Supreme Court upheld forced sterilization, to
suggest Jacobson does not comport with modern values.125 While Buck is a
stain on our jurisprudence and a very, very problematic case,126 it is not
Jacobson; modern sensibilities are rightly outraged by forced sterilization,127
but there is—appropriately—overwhelming support for vaccines that protect
children from diseases and save lives.128 Jacobson is maintained as a leading
121
122

123
124
125

126

127
128

Phillips, 775 F.3d at 540.
Whether or not the broader argument was a litigation strategy error on the part of the attorney
handling Phillips—or whether combining the two cases opposing exclusion during an outbreak with
a case directly attacking the lack of exemption—can be debated, and is not the focus of this Article.
Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 118, at 28.
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for a for Preliminary Injunction, and Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 10, Torrey-Love v.
Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No. 5:16-cv-2410-DMG-DTB (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) [hereinafter TorreyLove Preliminary Injunction Motion].
See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
30, 31 (1985) (“In the almost sixty years since Buck v. Bell was decided, commentators have
repeatedly attempted to understand its more problematic aspects.”).
PAUL A. OFFIT, PANDORA’S LAB 108–110 (2017) (showing how disease outbreak can undermine
education).
Cary Funk, Brian Kennedy & Meg Hefferon, Vast Majority of Americans Say Benefits of Childhood Vaccines
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case in public health where Buck v. Bell has long been relegated to the dustbin
of historical embarrassments because Jacobson protects important interests.
The Torrey-Love plaintiffs also attempted to distinguish Jacobson by
construing it narrowly (as did other litigants). In their motion for preliminary
injunction, plaintiffs stated:
The proper view recognizes Jacobson and its progeny as narrow, limited, and
distinguishable, consistent with modern precedent. The Jacobson line of
cases articulated that (a) a relatively self-contained township; (b) could
require an individual to be vaccinated against a highly contagious, airborne
disease; (c) or pay a fine; (d) during a serious outbreak of the same disease;
(e) before the era of widespread travel made such mandates less
meaningful.129

In footnote 9 to the Request, plaintiffs added: “The Jacobson line must be
read to impose limitations on the state’s police power in these situations,
including requirements of necessity, reasonableness, proportionality, and
clear harm avoidance.”130
Plaintiffs reiterated:
Once more, Jacobson and Zucht are instructive and provide a stark contrast
to the present situation. In those cases, towns passed laws, before the era of
international travel—indeed before much travel at all. Therefore, the
ordinances there were credibly tailored to meet its ends. The folly of
burdening California schoolchildren and infringing their fundamental
rights, while millions of unvaccinated foreign children alone visit the state
each year, is manifest.131

The first problem plaintiffs run into in this attempt to distinguish is that
two of their distinctions—the existence of an outbreak and the penalty in
Jacobson—are countered by Zucht. In Zucht, the Supreme Court, citing
Jacobson, upheld a school immunization mandate with no exemptions, at a
time when there was no active outbreak. In other words, attempts to narrow
Jacobson to a fine and an outbreak cannot pass the barrier of Zucht.

129
130
131

Outweigh Risks, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/02/02/vastmajority-of-americans-say-benefits-of-childhood-vaccines-outweigh-risks/; see also U.S. Infant
Vaccination Rates High, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 28, 2014),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p0828-infant-vaccination.html ; Immunization, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 03, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/
immunize.htm (noting that the vast majority of infants aged nineteen to thirty-five months had
received vaccinations for a variety of diseases).
Torrey-Love Preliminary Injunction Motion, supra note 125, at 10–11 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 11 n. 9.
Id. at 14–15 (footnote omitted). Note that the claim of infringing on the children’s constitutional
rights is the focus of the litigation, and not, as the plaintiffs phrase it, a foregone conclusion.
Arguably, protecting children from disease supports their right to life.
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Furthermore, in Whitlow, Judge Sabraw also addressed the claim of an
existence of an outbreak in Jacobson, and explained that the state’s interest in
protecting the health of children does not depend on the existence of a public
health emergency.132 He could also have gone further and reminded us that
Jacobson itself relied on school immunization requirements—not all of which
were during outbreaks—in its ruling, finding that an acceptable use of state
powers.133
Necessity does not by itself mean that there has to be an ongoing outbreak,
rather than a need to prevent one. The state does not have to wait for children
to be sick, die, or for costs to accumulate before adopting evidence-based
public health measures. It can adopt them to prevent such a result.
The other arguments are just as problematic. The “highly contagious,
airborne disease” claim applies just as much to several diseases we vaccinate
against, such as measles, chickenpox, whooping cough, and diphtheria. But
the fact that a dangerous disease is transmitted in another way doesn’t remove
its risk. Polio, for example, is very dangerous, and can be transmitted in the
school context.134 Limiting school immunization mandates just to airborne
diseases would leave children at unnecessary risk of other harmful diseases.
As to the fact that Jacobson and Zucht preceded modern air travel, the claim
seemed based on a misunderstanding of the way herd immunity operates.135
Herd immunity is even more important in a period of international travel.
Herd immunity means that enough people in the population are immune to
a disease that even if the disease is introduced, it will not reach the susceptible
people and outbreaks will either not happen at all or be limited and easily
contained.136 While an outbreak can certainly happen in a small, confined
community, in an era of international travel, the chances of a case being
introduced into the community are higher, not lower. Essentially, the size of
the “herd” is now bigger, and the community is no longer isolated—with these
interconnections increasing the risk of exposure. For example, an
unvaccinated child can travel abroad to a measles endemic country and
return with an infection—as has happened in the past.137 Generally, the CDC
132
133
134
135
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Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1090 (S.D. Cal. 2016)
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31–35 (1905).
See, e.g., Louis Weinstein, Poliomyelitis—A Persistent Problem, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 370 (1973)
(discussing a school-centered outbreak of the polio virus).
See Fine et al., supra note 20, at 911 (“Many examples of herd immunity have been described,
illustrating the importance of indirect protection for predicting the short- and long-term impact of
vaccination programs, for justifying them economically, and for understanding the nature of the
immunity induced by various vaccines.”).
Reiss, supra note 18, at 7–8.
David E. Sugerman et al., Measles Outbreak in a Highly Vaccinated Population, San Diego, 2008: Role of the
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explains that “Travelers with measles continue to bring the disease into the
U.S.” and “Measles can spread when it reaches a community in the U.S.
where groups of people are unvaccinated.”138 Unvaccinated visitors who
carry infections can infect unvaccinated children they interact with; those
children can in turn infect classmates and start an outbreak in their schools.
In other words, because we live in an era of international travel, and diseases
are routinely brought into the states by travelers, or United States based
travelers visit areas where diseases are endemic, having higher immunization
rates is crucial to prevent outbreaks. By limiting the number of unvaccinated
and unprotected children in communities, and especially in the hightransmission environment of the school,139 SB277 is very well tailored to meet
the end of preventing disease outbreaks.
In other words, the attempts to distinguish Jacobson and Zucht and the
subsequent cases were unconvincing, and indeed, those courts that had an
opportunity to examine them rejected them.140 Litigants were therefore
forced to try and look elsewhere to challenge the existing jurisprudence.
IV. SCHOOL MANDATES AND LEGAL CLAIMS
The focus of the rest of this Article is on the legal arguments made by
SB277 opponents in their effort to challenge the act, and why the courts in
question were correct to reject those arguments.
The arguments are
arranged from strongest to weakest. I consider the strongest (but still far from
compelling) arguments to be the claim that SB277 violates the right to
education embodied in the California constitution, violates the First
Amendment by requiring parents with religious objections to vaccinate, and
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Intentionally Undervaccinated, 125 PEDIATRICS 747, 748 (2010).
Measles Cases and Outbtreaks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 9, 2018)
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html.
See Muireann Brennan et al., Evidence for Transmission of Pertussis in Schools, Massachusetts, 1996:
Epidemiologic Data Supported by Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis Studies, 181 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 210,
214 (2000) (“[S]everal lines of evidence suggest that pertussis transmission occurred in
Massachusetts in 1996 and that school-aged children, particularly those aged 10-19 years, played
an important role in the statewide outbreak.”); Alan Hinman et al., Childhood Immunization: Laws that
Work, 30 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 122, 123 (2002) (noting that many vaccine-preventable diseases
were primarily being transmitted at school); Dieter Schenzle, An Age-Structured Model of Pre- and PostVaccination Measles Transmission, 1 IMA J. MATHEMATICS APPLIED MED. & BIOLOGY 169, 169
(1984) (discussing the fact that schools are areas of high disease transmission).
Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1092 (S.D. Cal. 2016). The federal district court that
dismissed Torrey-Love made short work of the cases, saying: “Though Plaintiffs assail these cases for
their age, they have not been overturned and are still good law and binding upon this Court.”
Torrey-Love v. California, No. 5:16-cv2410-DMG-DTB, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2017)
(footnote omitted).
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the new and creative argument that SB277 runs afoul of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, because the existing jurisprudence does not directly
address the first and the last, and because the question of religious freedom
is a current and contentious one.
Less strong, but still plausible, are the claims that SB277 violates parental
rights, substantive due process and equal protection. These are weaker
claims because existing jurisprudence—either on school mandates or more
generally—clearly addresses them and likely forecloses them.
Finally, I address two completely implausible arguments, founded on
misunderstanding of law—the argument that the state cannot mandate
products that are unavoidably unsafe or that liability protections cannot coexist with mandates and the claim legislators violating the law were involved
in a criminal conspiracy. These claims are addressed as a public service:
while implausible, they are likely to appeal to those without background in
law, and may be raised both in legislative debates and in lawsuits. By
addressing them here, I hope to arm legislators and courts with ready
counters, saving them work. These last arguments also demonstrate, in my
view, the extreme worldview of some of the litigants, and thus shed light on
the extreme edges of the anti-vaccine movement.
A. The Strongest Claims
1. A Constitutional Right to Education
Each of the lawsuits claimed that SB277 violates the right to education,
a fundamental right under California’s constitution.141 For example, the
plaintiffs in Whitlow said:
Plaintiff’s children have a fundamental right to education. . . . Serrano I
explained why education is a protected, fundamental right, citing (1) its
relationship to economic advancement; (2) its relevance to all aspects of
social life; (3) its duration of ten to thirteen years; (4) its impact on children’s
emotional and psychological health; and (5) its compulsory nature. Strict
Scrutiny must be applied to violations of fundamental protected rights under
the California State Constitution, or where suspect classifications are at
issue.142

This state law claim is likely the strongest claim the cases have, because
it had not been directly addressed by our jurisprudence, and is not
141
142

CAL. CONST. art. IX, §1.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, at 6, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079
(S.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-1715-DMS-BGS) (citing Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971)).
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implausible. There is no federally protected right to education.143 But many
states have constitutional clauses addressing education. California’s
constitution addresses education in Article IX Section 1 states:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific,
moral, and agricultural improvement.144

The subsequent constitutional sections set out many administrative
details of how the system will operate.145 In the 1970s, in a series of cases
addressing the funding of California’s educational system, the Supreme
Court of California found that California’s school funding system was
unconstitutional because it implicated a suspect category (wealth) in the
context of a fundamental interest (education).146 Serrano v. Priest correctly
stands for the premise that education is a fundamental interest under the
California constitution, and for the importance of access to education. The
question is whether SB277 violates it.
There are at least three compelling arguments against the claim that
SB277 violates the right to education. First, a starting point is that schools
were never an unregulated sphere, and regulating schools for health and
safety is one of the traditional roles of the state.147 A vaccine mandate is one
such health and safety regulation. Arguably, reducing the risks of outbreaks
protects education, since outbreaks undermine education in several ways.
Outbreaks undermine the education of the children who fall ill during the

143
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San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1. This language is fairly typical—many state constitutions have provisions
focused on public education. For example, Florida’s constitution says:
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida.
It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education
of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows
students to obtain a high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the
needs of the people may require.
FLA. CONST. art. IX, §1. Oklahoma’s says: “Provisions shall be made for the establishment and
maintenance of a system of public schools, which shall be open to all children of the state . . . .”
OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5. Arizona’s states: “The Legislature shall establish and maintain a system
of free public schools wherein all the children of the State may be educated.” Arizona’s says: “The
legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general
and uniform public school system . . . .” ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 2–14.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1255, 1258 (Cal. 1971); see also Serrano v. Priest
(Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 948 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Vaccines, School Mandates, and California’s Right to Education, 63 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 98, 108 (2015).
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outbreak, even more so if they are permanently disabled or killed by the
disease.148 Outbreaks also undermine education for unimmunized children
who need to be kept at home during the outbreak.149 In fact, since
vaccinating the child also helps to keep the child safe while in school,
something squarely within a parent’s responsibility, and squarely connected
to the child’s right to education (a child will not be getting an education if
sick, or worse, hurt by a disease), conditioning access to school on protecting
the child from disease is not squarely a clash.
An article written during the SB277 legislative process points out that in
at least one settled case brought under Serrano, the state’s duty to preserve the
health of California’s children while at school was emphasized—something
school mandates support.150 Opponents of SB277 attempt to use Serrano to
prevent the state from regulating schools to protect health. However, Serrano
focused on providing access to schools and preventing wealth-based
discrimination. Therefore, such an argument takes Serrano out of context
and undermines education—a fundamental interest.
In addition, when we are talking about access to education, it is important
to remember that there is one more group whose access is affected by
vaccination rates. Children with medical conditions that prevent vaccination
are often especially vulnerable to the risks of infectious diseases—for example,
children with cancer, or with transplants. When immunization rates in school
drop, those parents are faced with the choice of allowing the child into an area
vulnerable to outbreaks, risking the child’s life, or leaving the child out of
school—with the consequence of limiting that child’s access to education.
Strong school mandates protect that child, and allow her access to the school.
While not a legal barrier, it is a very real barrier to access. Why should we
prefer the access of the child whose parents chose not to vaccinate over the
access of the child whose parents cannot vaccinate?151
148
149
150
151

Id. at 109–10.
Id.
Elaine Won, Protecting Our Children: The California Public School Vaccination Mandate Debate, 10 CAL.
LEGAL HIST. 471, 479 (2015).
Reiss, supra note 147, at 108. For example, one of the speakers during the SB277 debate was six
year old Rhett Krawitt, a recovering leukemia patient who, because of his disease, could not be
vaccinated and was at risk during the measles outbreak. Because of the high rate of unvaccinated
children in his school, Rhett was at risk when attending the school, leading his family to express
concern about sending him there. See Jon Brooks, Boy Leukemia Patient Weighs in as Big Vaccine
Exemption Vote Nears, KQED (June 23, 2015), https://www.kqed.org/stateofhealth/39317/boyleukemia-patient-weighs-in-as-vote-on-vaccine-bill-nears; Tamar Lewin, Sick Child’s Father Seeks
Vaccination
Requirement
in
California,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
28,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/us/father-of-boy-with-leukemia-asks-california-schoolofficials-to-bar-unvaccinated-students.html.

238

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:1

Finally, because of the importance of the interest protected by school
mandates—that of preventing diseases that can kill, harm, or maim – the
right to education does not bar them. That is the reason that early cases
addressing school mandates in states that had a constitutional right to
education upheld them.152 In Whitlow, Judge Sabraw also addressed the
question what happens if the right to education is subject to heightened
review without ruling whether that is the case. He pointed out that our
jurisprudence implicitly or explicitly acknowledged that states have a
compelling interest in “fighting the spread of infectious diseases through
mandatory vaccination of school-aged children,” and went through a review
of the extensive jurisprudence supporting the point.153 In relation to whether
SB277 is the least restrictive means, the judge pointed to California’s goal, as
declared in the preamble to its school mandate statute—a goal of achieving
total immunization.154 The judge concluded that “[t]he objective of total
immunization is not served by a law that allows for PBEs, whether the PBE
rate is 2% or 25%.”155
In other words, the goal of achieving total immunization, with the view
of preventing diseases as much as possible, is a legitimate one, protecting a
compelling interest—and there is no real alternative to removing the PBE to
achieve it.
In ruling on this issue in Buck, the Court of Appeal of the Second
Appellate District—the only appellate decision on this so far—went further:
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Senate Bill No. 277 is not narrowly
tailored to meet the state’s interest, because there are less restrictive
alternatives (such as alternative means (unspecified) of immunization, and
quarantine in the event of an outbreak of disease). This argument fails, of
course, as compulsory immunization has long been recognized as the gold
standard for preventing the spread of contagious diseases. As is noted in the
legislative history, studies have found that “when belief exemptions to
vaccination guidelines are permitted, vaccination rates decrease,” and
community immunity wanes if large numbers of children do not receive
required vaccinations.156

152

153
154
155
156

Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97, 98 (N.Y. 1904) (“The right to attend the public schools of the state
is necessarily subject to some restrictions and limitations in the interest of the public health . . . If
vaccination strongly tends to prevent the transmission or spread of [smallpox], it logically follows
that children may be refused admission to the public schools until they have been vaccinated.”); see
also French v. Davidson, 143 Cal. 658, 662 (Cal. 1904) (holding that it is within the police power of
the State of California to say whether all school children should be vaccinated).
Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1089–90 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §120325(a) (West 2016).
Whitlow, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 1091.
Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135, 1146 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (citation omitted) (quoting
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In a similar vein, Won pointed out that there is no support or reason to
believe that less restrictive means would achieve the required rate for herd
immunity—over ninety or ninety-four percent for the most contagious
diseases—in schools where many parents are anti-vaccine.157 There is no
real evidence, therefore, that less restrictive means like an educational
requirement would protect the compelling interest of preventing outbreaks
of potentially fatal diseases.
Judge Sabraw concluded:
The right of education, fundamental as it may be, is no more sacred than
any of the other fundamental rights that have readily given way to a State’s
interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, and particularly,
school children. Because a personal belief exemption is not required in the
first instance, the State can remove it—and impinge on education rights–in
light of the compelling interest here. In this context, removal of the PBE is
necessary or narrowly drawn to serve the compelling objective of SB 277.158

As part of its argument in Whitlow that SB277 did not violate California’s
Right to Education, the state cited several cases from the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century—all upholding school immunization
mandates—on the basis that they do not violate the right to education.159
While these cases provide legitimate legal support for upholding SB277, the
arguments above are, in my view, stronger because the California cases in
question preceded Serrano, and the effect of Serrano on school immunization
mandates had not, at the beginning of the challenges, been litigated yet. At
this point, however, both several trial courts and the second appellate district
have ruled against the claims.
2. The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause
Three of the lawsuits—Whitlow, Buck, and Middleton—raised a First
Amendment claim. In its strongest form, the claim is that freedom of
religion, a fundamental right in our system, is undermined when parents with
religious opposition to vaccines are required to vaccinate their children in
order to send them to school. Both Jacobson and Zucht predated the

157
158
159

Assem. Comm. on Health, Analysis of S.B. No. 277, 2016 Reg. Sess., at 5 (Cal. 2015)).
Won, supra note 150, at 475–76, 499.
Whitlow, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 1091.
Abeel v. Clark, 24 P. 383, 383–84 (Cal. 1890) (upholding mandatory vaccination statute because
the law operated uniformly on all school); Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97, 98 (N.Y. 1904)
(upholding mandatory vaccination as consistent with the New York state Constitution); see also
Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Wendy E. Parmet, Shifting Vaccination Politics—The End of
Personal-Belief Exemptions in California, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED., 785, 787 (2015) (defending SB277
with state supreme court cases holding similar statutes as constitutional).
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incorporation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause towards the
state.160 So litigants could reasonably claim that they did not address whether
a religious exemption to immunization mandates is, today, constitutionally
require—since the First Amendment, at the time, did not apply to states.
That makes this claim, too, a plausible on—as does the fact that recent
Supreme Court cases raise questions about the future interpretation of the
First Amendment in this context.161
Our jurisprudence, however, does not support this, and there are good
grounds to think it will continue not to support it, at least in this context.
First, in obiter in Prince v. Massachusetts, the court made it clear that freedom
of religion “does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death,”162 and hence a
First Amendment claim cannot stand. This statement was relied on in
subsequent jurisprudence, most recently, at the federal appellate level, in
Phillips v. City of New York.163 While the Prince statement focusing on vaccines
is obiter, the ruling in the case was that even a combination of parental rights
and religious freedom cannot overcome legislation that protects children—
in that case, child labor law—and vaccines were mentioned as an example
of the application of that ruling. The conclusion, as the Court suggested, is
even stronger for requiring vaccines which protect both child and
community than it is for the child labor laws addressed in the case, which
affect primarily the child.
Furthermore, even beyond the immunization context, under Employment
Division v. Smith, legislatures are not required to offer a religious exemption
from a neutral law of general applicability.164 Immunization mandates are
clearly neutral on religion—they don’t target a specific religion, their focus is
on preventing disease—and hence, under Smith, don’t require a specific
mandate.165
160

161
162
163
164
165

But see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306–07 (1940) (incorporating the free exercise clause
towards the state). As a reminder, incorporation is the process by which the provisions of the Bill
of Rights, which originally applied only to the federal government, were applied to the states.
Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 154–158 (2014) (analyzing the
possible avenues First Amendment jurisprudence might take in the coming years post Hobby Lobby).
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944),
775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding New York can constitutionally require that all children
be vaccinated in order to attend public school).
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
Note that Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. did not overturn Smith on this, focusing on the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), not the First Amendment. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–
62 (2014). In fact, both majority and dissent included language that supported Smith. Id. at 2760,
2790. On whether RFRAs can pose an issue for vaccine mandates in states with religious freedom
restoration acts, see generally Dina Nathanson, Herd Protection v. Vaccine Abstention: Potential Conflict
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Some raised concern that the recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. may lead to expansion of a requirement of religious exemptions in
at least some contexts, a development which could have a variety of
potentially harmful effects in several contexts.166 However, Hobby Lobby itself
did not suggest a move to rethink the interpretation of the First Amendment,
and its opening clearly distinguished between interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act it focused on and interpreting the First
Amendment.167 Similarly, the more recently decided Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,168 which found in favor of a baker who
refused to make a cake for a gay couple, did not overturn Smith. The narrow
majority decision strongly focused on the lack of neutrality on the part of the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, as expressed in their statements and
actions.169 The Court’s focus was at what they saw as hostility to Mr.
Phillips—the baker’s—religious point of view, and the Court found that
unacceptable, in a 7-2 decision that included several of the liberal Justices on
the court.170 In one sense, this is not new—the Court has, in the past, struck
down actions where there was evidence of hostility of the government to a
specific belief.171 Since SB277—or immunization laws generally—are pretty
clearly not directed at a specific religious belief, but against nonimmunization, Masterpiece Cakeshop does not, arguably, touch it. In fact, the
change in the law removed a personal belief exemption that covered any
belief—it did not have to be religious, and it certainly did not focus on a
specific belief.172 However, there is a concern here. Both Hobby Lobby and
Masterpiece Cakeshop sided with an applicant seeking to expand his religious
freedom. While neither case is on point, insofar as they suggest an increasing
emphasis of the Supreme Court on religious freedom, there is a valid

166

167
168
169
170

171

172

Between School Vaccine Requirements and State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 621
(2016). This is an issue that deserves separate treatment, but may be beyond the scope of this
Article, as California has not implemented a RFRA. Reiss & Weithorn supra note 21, at 1612.
Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from AntiDiscrimination Laws, 28 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 72–74 (2015); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and
the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 92–100 (2015).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760–62.
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
Id. at 1729–31.
Id. at 1731–34 (Kagan, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented,
though they, too, agreed with part of the majority’s criticism of the Commission. Id. at 1748–52
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 545–46 (1993) (“A law burdening
religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous
of scrutiny.”).
S.B. 277, 2014–15 S., Reg. Sess. § 1(c) (Cal. 2015) (changing “Exemptions from immunization for
medical reasons or personal beliefs” to “Exemptions from immunization for medical reasons”).
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question about the continuous validity of Smith. At the same time, the
Supreme Court appears to be cautious in the steps it is making in this area,
and at this point, there is no good reason to assume they will extend the First
Amendment to undermine vaccines mandates—after all, the jurisprudence
upholding vaccine mandates predated Smith, and was not touched even in
the years before it.
In Whitlow, the plaintiffs tried to deal with Smith by claiming that SB277
involves a hybrid right.173 Rather than overruling the previous case of
Wisconsin v. Yoder,174 the Smith court distinguished the case as applying to
situations where there is a constellation of several rights—in Yoder, the
combination of parental rights to make education choices for their children
combined with religious freedom.175 In the case of vaccine mandates,
arguably, parental liberty to make medical decisions combines with religious
freedom in a similar constellation, and hence fits the category of hybrid
rights.176 If the hybrid rights doctrine applied, the lack of religious exemption
would be subject to strict scrutiny, which would reduce its chances of
surviving (though not eliminate them, as I will discuss later).177
The court in Whitlow rejected this claim, because “[t]he ‘hybrid rights
doctrine has been widely criticized, and, notably, no court has ever allowed
a plaintiff to bootstrap a free exercise claim in this manner.” Following that
directive, this Court declines to apply the “hybrid rights” doctrine to
Plaintiffs’ free exercise claim, and thus declines to apply strict scrutiny.178
Two other reasons support rejecting the claim. First, in Smith itself, the
court mentioned forced vaccination as an example that shows the problems
with requiring a religious exemption for every neutral law, suggesting that
forced vaccination squarely falls under Smith’s general ruling, and the lesser
requirement of school mandates even more so.179 Second, the recent case of

173
174
175

176
177
178
179

Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1086 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (“[T]hey argue they are
asserting ‘hybrid rights,’ which warrants strict scrutiny.”).
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (holding that Amish children could not
constitutionally be forced to attend public school past eighth grade by state law).
See Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (refusing to hold that “when otherwise
prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, . . . the conduct itself must be free
from governmental regulation”).
Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 899 (exploring the idea of this possible hybrid right argument
in a larger context).
Id. at 896–97 (stating that laws subject to strict scrutiny are less likely to be upheld).
Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1086 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888–89 (“The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of
constitutionally required religious exemptions . . . [to] compulsory vaccination laws.”).
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Hobby Lobby180 suggests that the cases referred to as creating the hybrid rights
doctrine are no longer a good framework.181
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, therefore, does not
prevent states from removing non-medical exemptions. At least one court
and one scholar go further: they consider religious exemptions to violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment182 and the Due
Process Clause in it.183
3. Unconstitutional Conditions
The plaintiffs in Torrey-Love tried to use the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions to challenge SB277. They argued that SB277 impermissibly
requires that children wanting to exercise their constitutional right to
education give up rights to privacy, bodily autonomy, or that their parents
give up the right to make medical decisions for their children. That, claims
the complaint, is impermissible under our Supreme Court doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.184 The complaint in state court put it thus:
If the state may compel the surrender of a constitutional right as a condition
of its favor, then the guaranties embedded in the Constitution may be
manipulated out of existence. In such case, the “government bears a heavy
burden of demonstrating the practical necessity for [such a] limitation. At
the very least it must establish that the imposed conditions relate to the
purposes of the legislation which confers the benefit or privilege.”. . . Put
simply, the “state may not impose conditions which require the
relinquishment of constitutional rights.”185

The federal court that dismissed Torrey-Love did not thoroughly discuss
the argument. It correctly pointed out that, under our jurisprudence,
children do not have a fundamental right to refuse immunization before
attending school.186 In essence, it rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to frame the
issue as separate rights to various things and pointed out the jurisprudence
focused on whether immunization mandates are constitutional. The court
180
181
182
183

184
185
186

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–62 (2014) (analyzing the movement
away from the Sherbert test in recent decades by the Supreme Court).
See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 899–900 (using Smith and Hobby Lobby to argue against
vaccination refusal as a protected right under a hybrid rights theory).
See Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979) (holding that a religious exemption clause in
a statute mandating vaccinations violates the Equal Protection Clause).
Allan J. Jacobs, Do Belief Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination Programs Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?, 42 U.
MEM. L. REV. 73, 98–102 (2011) (arguing that the holding in Brown could be upheld on either an Equal
Protection basis, as Brown did, or under a Due Process basis by those who cannot receive vaccinations).
Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 10.
Id. (quoting Bagley v. Wash. Twp. Hosp. Dist., 421 P.2d 409, 414 (Cal. 1966)).
Torrey-Love v. California, 5:16-cv2410-DMG-DTB, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2017).
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does not have to accept the plaintiffs’ framing, and following the specific
jurisprudence is a legitimate way to handle the claim. The federal court
rejected the claim based on the fact that none of the rights claimed was
absolute.187
In an article on the topic, Professor Cass Sunstein suggested the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is unhelpful because it removes the focus
from the right questions and distracts attention from whether the
government is inappropriately infringing on protected constitutional rights
(even if indirectly).188 If that is the focus, the federal court’s approach is
correct: the determining question is whether the government is
impermissibly trying to infringe on protected rights, or indeed is infringing
on them—and for school immunization, extensive jurisprudence shows that
is not the case: There is no protected right to send a child to school without
vaccinating the child.189
In this Article, however, I believe it is important to also address the
unconstitutional conditions claim on its merits. In my view, it is a creative
and smart legal argument, but in this context, it does not work well for three
reasons. First, the doctrine is nowhere as clear-cut as the plaintiffs assert;
second, under the most common modes of analysis the plaintiffs fail its
application; and third, the specific rights claims do not hold well in this case.
The starting point is that the jurisprudence about unconstitutional
conditions is extremely conflicting and unclear. To give two examples, in
1991, the Supreme Court found that it was constitutional for Congress to
restrict funding to programs that counseled on family planning when those
programs also offered counseling on abortion. The Court upheld the
condition even though it potentially implicated the doctor’s right to free
speech, and less directly, a woman’s right to abortion.190 In contrast, the
Supreme Court struck down a California Coastal Commission plan to offer
coastal owners benefits for allowing the public to use their waterfront.191

187
188

189
190
191

See id. at 6–7 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments under each theory in turn).
Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 339–
41 (1989) (arguing that, by focusing more on the differences between certain rights, we can more
readily explain why some governmental actions are constitutional and others are not).
See Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 542–43 (2nd Cir. 2015) (rejecting a substantive due
process argument for the right to not vaccinate one’s child).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178, 192, 196 (1991).
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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An article examining constitutional conditions explained:
Despite early judicial assertions that such offers are, on the one hand, always
permissible or, on the other, always unconstitutional, it is now universally
recognized that such conditional offers are sometimes constitutionally
permissible and sometimes not. Indeed, correctly understood, that is all the
famed and contentious unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds. The
persistent challenge, consequently, has been to articulate some coherent or
at least intelligible principles or tests by which to determine which offers fall
into which category-to explicate, in other words, a theory to support the
doctrine. Regrettably, more than a century of judicial and scholarly
attention to the problem has produced few settled understandings.192

In other words, the doctrine means that sometimes conditions are
unconstitutional and sometimes they are not—and there is no guiding
principle to know which is which. There have certainly been efforts to
impose guiding principles on the doctrine, but there is no clear
jurisprudential acceptance of any of them.193
The lack of clear guidance as to its application does not make the doctrine
illegitimate; it does make it unclear. When an ill-defined, unclear in scope
doctrine like this runs against a consistent line of cases upholding school
immunization mandates, the argument is not very strong.
In the same article, Mitchell Berman examines one possible analysis the
Supreme Court used to analyze constitutional conditions; that analysis
focuses on the relation between the condition and the benefit.194 In his
discussion, Berman points out that the Court’s application of the relationship
was itself inconsistent.195 In one case, Nollan, the Court focused on whether
there was a link between the condition and the purpose—whether an
unrelated condition was only added to coerce, with no direct link to the
legitimate government action—and an (misapplied, in Berman’s view)
inquiry into whether the purpose of the condition is connected to denying

192

193
194

195

Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO.
L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (footnotes omitted); see also Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional
Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 67 (2013) (“But an amusing aspect of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
is that there is no doctrine. At least there is no snappy and established test for analyzing
unconstitutional conditions questions.”).
See generally Berman, supra note 192; Brian T. Hodges, Are Critical Area Buffers Unconstitutional?
Demystifying the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 8 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 1, 25–29 (2018).
Berman, supra note 192, at 90–93 (contrasting the central inquiry and conceptual treatment of
germaneness doctrine in Nollan and Dole, and criticizing the Court’s use of germaneness as a
“heuristic device” lacking in jurisprudential rigor).
Id. at 90–91 (noting the analytical similarities between Nollan and Dole, but arguing that each case
posed distinct questions diverging in treatment of the germaneness inquiry).
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the benefit.196 In Dole, the Court looked at whether the condition was related
to the purpose of granting the benefit.197 But with vaccines both inquiries
lead to the same place. Using the Nollan inquiry, the focus is on whether the
denial of school attendance fits the purpose of the act. In that case, the goal
of SB277 is achieving total immunization, with the purpose of making
schools safer from the diseases in question; making schools safer from disease
is a legitimate state interest, and requiring vaccines is very, very germane to
the state interest, and in fact, it is the heart of achieving it. So, under this
approach, the plaintiffs would fail. Using the Dole inquiry, if the benefit is
school attendance, still a large purpose of SB277 is allowing students to safely
attend school, and the condition fits it.
Berman suggests his own more coherent solution—he suggests seeing
conditions as presumably unconstitutional if they involve coercion—and he
defines coercion as a situation in which doing the threatened act would be
unconstitutional,198 for example, if a benefit is withheld for unconstitutional
purposes.199 But, as already addressed in the previous sections, school
immunization mandates are constitutional, even through a prism of the right
to education. Under this approach, too, the plaintiffs would fail.
Another, more recent attempt by Elhauge to offer a coherent approach
to the problem would also not help SB277 opponents.200 This article suggests
a distinction between contrived and uncontrived threats. Under this
standard, school mandates would also not be unconstitutional—because “the
government has a power to order the relevant action because the individual
or state has no constitutional right against such compulsion. Whenever
direct coercion is permissible, that fact moots the issue of when threats of
otherwise-lawful action should be deemed coercive, because they would be
permissible either way.”201 As explained, the jurisprudence supports
requiring that children be vaccinated.

196
197

198
199
200

201

Id. at 90 (explaining the condition in Dole could not stand because it was not germane to the
legitimate purposes for which the agency could deny the benefit).
Id. at 91 (internal citations omitted) (breaking down Chief Justice Rehnquist’s inquiry into discrete
questions that “compared the government’s purpose for imposing the condition with its purpose
for granting the benefit”).
Id. at 16–18 (stating a normative definition for coercion and applying it within the context of
constitutional violations).
Id. at 19 (noting that even where the Constitution does not require a state to give a benefit, a state may
act unconstitutionally if it offers that benefit and withholds it based on an unconstitutional purpose).
Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats versus Uncontrived Warnings: A General Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual
Duress, Unconstitutional Conditions, and Blackmail, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 503, 505–06 (2016) (summarizing
the doctrinal problems posed by the unconstitutionality of coercion and offering a coherent theory).
Id. at 506.
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Further, the rights allegedly violated by the condition do not withstand
closer scrutiny. One claim is that the right in tension with attending schools
is the right of the plaintiff minor children—mostly five to seven-year-olds,
one nine-year-old, one eleven-year-old—to bodily autonomy and to refuse
medical treatments.202 The right to bodily autonomy is a very important
right in our system and has been for a long time.203 But it does not apply in
the same way to children.204 The five, six, or seven-year-old plaintiffs in
Torrey-Love did not make the decision to not vaccinate and not protect
themselves from diseases like diphtheria, hib, polio, and measles themselves.
Even the nine and eleven-year-old plaintiffs did not make a unilateral
decision. It is the parent making the choice here. Talking about a child’s
bodily autonomy in this context is simply wrong. Would these parents let the
child decide about other treatments, including alternative treatments they
think their children should get? Would these parents allow a child that wants
to be vaccinated to get the vaccine? There is little debate that children at
that age do not make their own medical decisions, and the issue is not their
bodily autonomy.
Another right mentioned is the right of privacy, a right the Torrey-Love
lawsuit correctly described as broader in California than the federal right to
privacy.205 Plaintiffs correctly point out that this right has also been applied
to minors in some contexts,206 and, as they quote, it applies in matters
concerning “the preservation of . . . personal health” and matters involving
“retaining personal control over the integrity of [one’s] own body.”207
202

203

204
205

206

207

See, e.g., Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 11 (arguing that the California vaccination mandate
and disclosure of exemption violate the right to bodily autonomy under the state and federal
constitutions).
The right to bodily autonomy was acknowledged at least since Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp.,
105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .”).
Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 904–05 (noting that the Court has recognized that the
government has greater authority to “regulate the lives of children”).
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4, Torrey Love v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No. SCV0039311,
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 7, 2017) [hereinafter Torrey-Love Opposition to Demurrer] (basing its
argument on Williams v. Superior Court, 236 Cal. App. 4th 1151 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). Though,
as will be discussed, the California Supreme Court overturned the decision. Williams v. Superior
Court, 398 P. 3d 69, 86–88 (Cal. 2017).
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 813–14 (Cal. 1997) (finding that a statute that
restricts a pregnant minor’s ability to decide on an abortion implicates a “constitutionally protected
privacy interest.”).
Torrey-Love Opposition to Demurrer, supra note 205, at 4 (citing Lungren, 940 P.2d at 813). On
medical matters, see also Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that
a patient has a “legally cognizable interest in maintaining the privacy of [their] detailed medical
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From that, plaintiffs concluded that “Section 120325 is unconstitutional
because it requires a child to reveal intimate medical history details before
attending school.”208 This conclusion, however, is both extreme and
unsupported by the jurisprudence. The disclosure in question is providing
school officials with a child’s immunization record or medical exemption.
Under plaintiffs’ approach, a child—or more accurately, the child’s
parents—will not have to alert the school to any medical problems the child
has, even ones that may put the child or others at risk during school hours.
Schools are responsible for a child’s welfare during hours—and that comes
with a need to know certain medical facts about the child, making applying
a strong right of privacy against the school inappropriate. In relation to
vaccines, and if taken to its logical conclusion, the claim does not only require
the return of the exemption—it requires striking down the pre-SB277 law.
The previous law required that parents provide the child’s immunization
records or an exemption form.209 A personal belief exemption form would
violate the child’s privacy in the same way that a medical exemption does,
by at least letting the school know that the child is unvaccinated. If the
concern is a stigma attached to the child, that would also be covered. Such
a conclusion would prevent, for example, keeping unvaccinated children out
during outbreak, putting them and the public health at risk. It could also
cause a more direct risk to the child if she were, for example, exposed to
tetanus on the school grounds and those treating her did not know she is
unprotected against it.
Such a conclusion is also not required by California’s jurisprudence. The
standard in question has been set by the California Supreme Court in Hill v.
National College Athletic Association and was recently reaffirmed in Lewis v.
Superior Court.210 Lewis v. Superior Court provides a summary of California’s
standard for privacy violations:
[T]he complaining party must meet three “‘threshold elements’ . . . utilized
to screen out claims that do not involve a significant intrusion on a privacy
interest protected by the state constitutional privacy provision.” The party
must demonstrate “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant

208
209

210

information” given to a doctor).
Torrey-Love Opposition to Demurrer, supra note 205, at 5.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120365 (West 2015) (providing an exemption for submitting
immunizations forms where the parents has filed a letter or affidavit affirming that immunizations
are contrary to their beliefs).
Hill v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 657 (Cal. 1994) (defining a conjunctive test for
invasions of privacy based on the Privacy Initiative of the California Constitution); Lewis v.
Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1018 (Cal. 2017) (outlining the required elements for proving an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy based on the Hill test).
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constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” This initial inquiry is necessary
to “permit courts to weed out claims that involve so insignificant or de
minimis an intrusion on a constitutionally protected privacy interest as not
even to require an explanation or justification by the defendant.”
Second, if a claimant satisfies the threshold inquiry, “[a] defendant may
prevail in a state constitutional privacy case by negating any of the three
elements just discussed or by pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense,
that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one
or more countervailing interests.” “The plaintiff, in turn, may rebut a
defendant’s assertion of countervailing interests by showing there are feasible
and effective alternatives to defendant’s conduct which have a lesser impact
on privacy interests.”211

It is very clear that the right to privacy of medical records is not
absolute.212 Here, there is no good reason to claim that a child in school has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances against the school
authorities—who are entrusted with the child’s wellbeing and need to be
privy to medical information allowing them to take care of it. We are not
discussing broadcasting a child’s medical information to the public. And the
fact that California has had a school immunization law that required filing
medical and personal belief exemptions for decades also goes against the view
that a child has a reasonable expectation of privacy in this context.
A person seeking to prevent disclosure of immunization preferences may
have a lesser privacy interest against disclosure. Lewis, citing Hill, stated that:
The standard that a defendant’s proffered countervailing interests must
satisfy varies based on the privacy interest asserted: “Where the case involves
an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy, e.g.,
freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue consensual
familial relationships, a ‘compelling interest’ must be present to overcome
the vital privacy interest. If in contrast, the privacy interest is less central, or
in bona fide dispute, general balancing tests are employed.” “The existence
of a sufficient countervailing interest or an alternative course of conduct
present[s] threshold questions of law for the court. The relative strength of
countervailing interests and the feasibility of alternatives present mixed
questions of law and fact. . . . [I]n cases where material facts are undisputed,
211

212

Lewis, 397 P.3d at 1018 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d
1200 (Cal. 1997); then quoting Hill, 865 P.2d 633; then quoting Loder, 927 P.2d 1200; and then
quoting Hill, 865 P.2d 633) (stating the legal standard for establishing and defending privacy
violations based on the Hill standard). The plaintiffs in Torrey-Love cited another case that used the
first part of the Hill test. Torrey-Love Opposition to Demurrer, supra note 205, at 5 (citing Willard
v. AT&T Commc’ns of Cal., Inc., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636, 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)). However,
Lewis provides more recent and authoritative guidance on the standard.
See People v. Martinez, 88 Cal. App. 4th 465, 474–75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“Defendant’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in his medical/psychological records must be evaluated in light of his
criminal background, his status as a prisoner, and the provisions of the SVPA.”).
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adjudication as a matter of law may be appropriate.”213

Here, there is an argument that the interest is not fundamental to
personal autonomy: even if education is a fundamental interest, it is not
directly about autonomy. The only case in which a compelling interest was
required was in Lungren, where the question was a minor’s direct access to
abortion.214 Attending school is important, but does not have the same
implication for bodily autonomy that deciding whether to have an abortion
does. The question is not whether parental consent is required to agree to a
vaccine. The question, simply, is whether informing the school about a
child’s medical exemption or lack thereof violates a right to privacy. The
same autonomy interest is not involved; the claim the plaintiffs make is that
this will impose stigma on the child.215 This claim fits more clearly into cases
that were handled under a balancing test.216
If that’s the case, all that is needed is a balance between the state’s interest
in preventing diseases that can kill and maim and the limited invasion of
privacy that providing school authorities with a child’s immunization status
or medical exemption presents. Even if we applied the compelling interest
test, that test is met by the need to prevent disease. But it is unlikely that
requirement applies here.
Finally, the plaintiffs claim SB277 conditions education on their use of
their right as parents to make medical decisions for their children.217 This is
probably the strongest argument, but as addressed in Section II.B.1 below, it
is not convincing in this context, because parental rights are not absolute—
and the jurisprudence has allowed states to limit it in the vaccination context.
Again, as Prince v. Massachusetts stated, parental rights (or religious freedom)
do not “include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”218

213
214

215
216

217
218

Lewis, 397 P.3d at 1018 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Hill, 865 P.2d
at 653, 657).
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 818–19 (Cal. 1997) (finding that where the
statute infringes on a fundamental interest in personal autonomy of pregnant minors, the Court
must apply a more stringent “compelling interest” standard to justify the intrusion).
Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 12 (stating that families will face stigma for disclosing
“confidential medical decisions”).
For example, in Loder v. City of Glendale, an employer’s drug testing of an employee could violate
constitutional privacy rights, but whether it did or did not depends on reasonableness in the
circumstances. 927 P.2d 1200, 1221 (Cal. 1997).
Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 12 (arguing that SB227 infringes on the parents’ right to
make medical decisions for their children).
321 U.S. 158, 166–167 (1944) (citation omitted) (citing People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903).
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B. Claims Contradicted Directly by the School Mandates Jurisprudence
The next set of claims is less strong, in my view, because it is addressed
by extensive and well-founded jurisprudence that is unlikely to be completely
overturned.
1. Parental Rights
Each of the complaints claimed that SB277 violates parental rights. The
argument is that by forcing parents to choose between vaccinating and
sending a child to private or public school (or daycare), the law coerces
parents to vaccinate, and violates their right to make decisions. In Whitlow,
the lawyers made an effort to find litigants they could present as having a real
problem with keeping their children out of school. One plaintiff was a single
mother. In Torrey-Love, too, the complaint emphasized that the plaintiffs had
to forgo “much-needed income” to homeschool.219
Parental rights are very, very important in our system—but they have
never been absolute.220 And for over a century, consistent jurisprudence
upheld school immunization mandates in spite of the important status of
parental rights in our system.221 The rationale, as Professor Weithorn and I
previously discussed, is that school immunization mandates protect two sets
of important interests: a child’s interest in being protected from disease, and
the state’s public health interest in preventing an outbreak.222 In a real sense,
the parental rights argument is very problematic in this context. The risks of
vaccinating, for every child but the few with medical contraindications—
children who are not required to vaccinate under SB277—are much smaller
than the risks of not vaccinating (which puts the child at physical risk).223 This
is a long-standing reason to act and limit parental rights. Furthermore,
sending an unvaccinated child to school also affects other families and their
children, and the argument that one’s parental rights justify putting other
children at risk is even weaker.
219
220

221
222
223

Torrey Love Complaint, supra note 65, at 3–4 (arguing that SB227 infringes on the parents right to
make medical decisions for their children).
See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Rights of the Unvaccinated Child, 73 STUD. L., POLS., & SOC’Y, 73, 79–80
(2017); Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 909–10 (footnotes omitted) (noting that states usually
defer to parents on decisions regarding their children, but “parental discretion is not unlimited . . .
where the benefits to the child are uncertain or outweighed by risks.”).
Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21, at 913 n.132 (footnotes omitted) (pointing to Supreme Court
precedent authorizing states to require parents to vaccinate their children).
Id. at 914 (comparing vaccination requirements to other compulsory rules regulating children, and
arguing that vaccination mandates serve both immediate and long-term needs).
Supra Part I.
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Initially, I was of the view that there is also an argument that SB277 does
not force parents to vaccinate, because of the existence of alternatives, such
as homeschooling.224 I have somewhat retreated from that position, though.
For some parents, circumstances may make homeschooling untenable or
require them to choose between earning a living wage and homeschooling.
It is certainly problematic to claim there is no coercion in those
circumstances, as the plaintiffs point out.
I maintain, however, that there are degrees of coercion, and that the level
of coercion in SB277 is less than in other contexts. It is important to
remember that there is jurisprudence supporting direct coercion of parents
who refuse medical treatment in circumstances that put children at risk, even
if the risk there was more visible and imminent than in this context.225 In
Philadelphia in 1991, during a measles outbreak that killed nine children, a
judge ordered vaccination of children in recalcitrant religious communities
over parental objection.226 In some cases in the 1950s–1960s, parents were
criminally charged and sometimes convicted of non-vaccination and
truancy.227 SB277 does not go that far.
School immunization mandates certainly burden choice substantially but
are less coercive than direct force or criminalization accompanied by the
threat of incarceration, for example.228 In this way, it is a less coercive tool
from the state’s arsenal of tools to promote vaccination, though still a real
and potentially serious imposition. In a recent book, Linda Fentiman
compares the relatively gentle treatment non-vaccinating mothers are
subjected to the much harsher, more coercive treatment meted out to poor
mothers who put their children at risk in various ways, for example, by drug

224
225
226

227

228

See Won, supra note 73, at 494–95 (explaining the existence of free homeschooling and independent
study options).
Reiss, supra, note 220, at 91–95.
PAUL A. OFFIT, BAD FAITH: WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDERMINES MODERN MEDICINE 66–
80 (2015) (providing an example of courts intervening with child welfare when parents with strong
religious beliefs refuse their children medical treatment).
Efthimios Parasidis & Douglas J. Opel, Parental Refusal of Childhood Vaccines and Medical Neglect Laws,
107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 68, 69–70 (2017) (illustrating the court frequently finding parents guilty
of child neglect for failing to immunize their children); Reiss, supra note 219, at 89.
See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 21 at 960–62 (“A mandate, as discussed here, burdens choice fairly
heavily, while not eliminating it completely. It requires that persons engage in affirmative
conduct—in this case, vaccination of children—accompanied by a threat of deleterious
consequences for noncompliance. . . . We place school-entry vaccination requirements in this
category, recognizing the centrality of elementary and secondary school attendance as a cherished
opportunity in American society. Removal of that opportunity introduces an exceptional and
perhaps unequalled deprivation into the lives of those prevented from attending.”)
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use during pregnancy.229 She, too, highlights the less coercive treatment
these mothers—mostly white and middle class—receive.230
When it comes to sending unvaccinated children to school, the argument
for a parental right to send the child to school unvaccinated runs into two
other important sets of rights, the right of the child to health, and the right of
other families for a safe school environment.231 The state could have chosen
to criminalize non-vaccinating—as it criminalized other decisions that put
children at risk—and may have been more justified here, because of the effect
on others (a counter to that argument is that in areas with high vaccine rates,
herd immunity makes the risk less imminent; state legislation, however, is
hard to target that finely). SB277 is a less coercive option than what the state
could have chosen, and parental rights are not a barrier to it.
2. Equal Protection
An equal protection claim was raised in the lawsuits in two versions. One
is extreme and one more is nuanced, but both face similar problems. In the
extreme version, the Buck plaintiffs stated that:
SB277 will segregate children based on whether they are vaccinated or
unvaccinated, and this constitutes discrimination based on “vaccination
status.” Under a Brown v. Board of Education analysis, such a bifurcated school
system—vaccinate [sic] and unvaccinated—reeks of separate-but-equal and
thus, cannot stand. Under California law, segregation based on vaccination
status is every bit as odious as segregation based on race, creed or color.232

In the most nuanced version, the Whitlow plaintiffs stated that:
SB 277 violates equal protection by denying some children their
fundamental right to an education, while preserving the right for others.
SB 277 treats healthy children with PBEs differently from all other
California children by denying them an education. SB 277 violates equal
protection by excluding children with PBEs who have reached
“checkpoints,” treating them differently than other children with PBEs.
There is no legitimate reason to differentiate a seventh grader from a sixth
grader or an eighth grader. SB 277 does this for administrative ease, not
any legitimate, let alone compelling, state interest.
Further, SB 277 violates the equal protection rights of special education
students. First, as written, SB 277 exempts special education students with
IEPs pursuant to IDEA who are entitled to FAPE under federal law but does
229

230
231
232

LINDA FENTIMAN, BLAMING MOTHERS: AMERICAN LAW AND THE RISKS TO CHILDREN’S
HEALTH 247, 273–74 (2017) (comparing the different treatment of mother’s who do not vaccinate
their children with mother’s who engage in other behavior society deems neglectful).
Id. at 273–74 (indicating racial disparities).
Won, supra note 143, at 479, 484.
Buck Complaint, supra note 87, at 3.
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not exempt students with 504 plans pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. . . .233

In both cases, the problem plaintiffs face is that they are incorrect in
claiming discrimination, and less correct in claiming illegal discrimination.
Discrimination happens when like cases are treated differently—different
treatment of different cases does not violate equal protection.234 But
vaccinated and unvaccinated children are not alike. This is true whether the
child is missing one vaccine or is completely unvaccinated. Modern vaccines
are not perfect, but they are highly effective: the vaccines required for school
attendance usually range in effectiveness from seventy to ninety-seven
percent.235 As a result, children who get these vaccines are much less likely
to get the diseases than their unprotected, unvaccinated peers. Studies
repeatedly and consistently show higher rates of preventable diseases among
the unvaccinated.236
Sending a completely or partially unvaccinated child to school creates a
preventable risk that the child will infect other children, for example, children
who cannot be vaccinated, young siblings of classmates – too young to be
fully vaccinated - or the rare few that suffer vaccine failure. At least two
measles outbreaks in the United States, for example, started when
233

234
235

236

Memorandum of Points & Auths. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
*23, Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (C.D. Cal 2016) (No. 3:16-CV-01715-DMSGBS).
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply
to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV 575, 590–91 (1983).
See Aruna Chandran, James P. Watt & Mathuram Santosham, Haemophilus Influenzae Vaccines,
VACCINES 167, 175–176 (Stanley A. Plotkin, Walter Orenstein & Paul A. Offit eds., 2013); see also
Haemophilus Influenza Type B, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/downloads/hib.pdf (finding that the vaccine
against Hib consistently shows to protect over 90% of children who complete the series); Emmanuel
Vidor, Stanley A. Plotkin, Poliovirus Vaccine—Inactivated Vaccines 573, 587–588 (Stanley A. Plotkin,
Walter Orenstein and Paul A. Offit eds. 2013) (noting the high efficacy rates of various polio
vaccines): Poliomyelitis, in VACCINES 167, 175–176 (Stanley A. Plotkin, Walter Orenstein & Paul A.
Offit eds., 2013); see also Haemophilus Influenza Type B, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/downloads/polio.pdf (showing
that the inactivated vaccine against polio consistently shows over eighty percent effectiveness and
in some studies, over ninety-five percent effectiveness in preventing paralytic polio); see also Reiss,
supra note 18, at 9–10 (illustrating similar statistics indicating vaccines reducing various diseases).
Most recently, a review showed that a relationship between vaccination and contracting measles
and pertussis. Varun K. Phadke et al., Association Between Vaccine Refusal and Vaccine-Preventable Diseases
in the United States: A Review of Measles and Pertussis, 315 [J]AMA 1149, 1158 (2016); Invasive Haemophilus
Influenzae Type B Disease in Very Young Children—Minnesota, 2008, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION:
MORBIDITY
&
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
(Jan.
30
2009),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5803a4.htm; Jason M. Glanz, et al.,
Parental Refusal of Pertussis Vaccination Is Associated With an Increased Risk of Pertussis Infection in Children,
123 PEDIATRICS 1446, 1449–50 (2009).
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unvaccinated children traveled to Europe, contracted measles there, and
brought it back.237 While a vaccinated child can also be among the small
percent for whom the vaccine fails, and may also catch and transmit the
disease, that situation is much less likely and unpreventable. It is the
difference between an accident caused because someone made a conscious
decision not to maintain her brakes, and an accident caused because of an
unpreventable and rare mechanical brake failure. We treat the cases
differently because the first is the result of a choice not to prevent a risk, and
the second is the result of pure bad luck, with no real precaution available to
reduce the risk. It is a meaningful difference.
Not only can unvaccinated children themselves contract and transmit a
disease, but a concentration of such children undermines herd immunity.
This puts the community at increased risk of outbreaks.238 In fact, there is
evidence that a child is safer from preventable disease if she’s unvaccinated
in a community with high vaccination rates than if she is vaccinated in a
community with low rates.239 In this sense, too, unvaccinated children are
meaningfully different than vaccinated ones. By congregating, they can
create a risk of an outbreak in a community, putting everyone at risk.
Since the cases of vaccinated and unvaccinated children are not alike, it
is not discrimination to treat them differently.
Furthermore, there is a big difference between status-based distinctions
and those relying on choice. Our system treats historically vulnerable groups
differently than it treats other classifications, and certainly those based on riskcausing behavior. Children whose parents chose not to vaccinate are very,
very different from children from minority groups based on ethnicity or
religion. If a parent sent the unvaccinated child to school in violation of
SB277, the child would be denied access, and that is not discrimination. It is
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Parker et al., supra note 74, at 447 (illustrating that disease epidemics occurring in the United States
often are a result of a non-vaccinated individual traveling abroad and bringing the disease back
into the United States); Sugerman, supra note 74, at 747 (providing another example of an individual
traveling abroad and bringing into the United States a seemingly eradicated virus).
See Bradford & Mandich, supra note 7, at 1383 (finding that more effective state immunization
policies increase overall immunity to diseases within the community); P Gahr et al., An Outbreak of
Measles in an Undervaccinated Community, 134 PEDIATRICS 3220, 3220 (2014) (outlining the possibility
that once eradicated diseases could become epidemics should widespread immunization not be
maintained); Omer et al., supra note 26, at 1389 (illustrating the increased prevalence of disease in
communities with larger numbers of children who have not been vaccinated); Omer et al., supra
note 25, at 1757 (illustrating the increased prevalence of disease in communities with larger
numbers of children who have not been vaccinated).
S. von den Hof et al., Measles Epidemic in the Netherlands: 1999–2000, 186 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES
1483, 1485 (2002) (illustrating the principle of herd immunity).

256

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:1

a consequence imposed as a result of the parent’s choice not to protect the child
from disease—for the protection of the child and others. It is not
discrimination because it is based on behavior. As I have explained elsewhere:
Behavior that imposes risks on others can and should be regulated. For
example, the state can and does regulate one’s ability to drink and drive;
while you are free to drink, the state can penalize you if you drive while
under the influence, because that behavior creates a risk. . . .
In this context, parents who choose not to vaccinate are more like those
who choose to drink and drive than . . . members of an ethnic group. They
have no more claim of discrimination than does the Association Against
Discriminating on the Basis of Alcohol Consumption (ADOBAC).240

Judge Sabraw, in Whitlow, addressed this issue thus:
Here, none of the disputed classifications supports an equal protection
claim. First, children with PBEs are not similarly situated to children without
PBEs. Nor are children at “checkpoints” similarly situated to children not
at “checkpoints.” And the same may be said of children with IEPs versus
those without. In each of those categories, the children are not similarly
situated, which dooms Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.
Moreover, even if these children were similarly situated, these
classifications would not violate the equal protection clause. Plaintiffs have
failed to show that children with PBEs, children at “checkpoints,” and
section 504 children are members of a suspect class. Plaintiffs have also
failed to show that these classifications burden a fundamental right. Thus,
these classifications would be subject to rational basis review, not strict
scrutiny.241

And, explains the judge, all the classifications have a rational basis behind
them.242

240
241

242

Reiss supra note 147, at 107 (footnotes omitted). ADOBAC is a fictional association.
Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079,. 1087 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (footnotes omitted) (first citing
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985); then citing San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)).
Id. at 1087–88.
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3. Substantive Due Process
All the lawsuits raised a claim of substantive due process. This claim is
tied to the claim of violation of parental liberties, which have long since been
considered part of the liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment.243 However, such rights, as discussed, are not absolute, and in
the context of vaccines, the jurisprudence has long rejected due process
challenges to school mandates as far back as Zucht.244 Most recently, both
Phillips245 and Workman246 rejected an identical claim. And in Whitlow, citing
these cases, Judge Sabraw found that the due process claim is foreclosed by
Zucht, and also rejected the claim.247
An extensive jurisprudence rejects the argument that substantive due
process is violated when a parent is denied the possibility of sending an
unvaccinated child to school, something that risks both the child and others.
C. Implausible Claims
Two very implausible claims were raised in the lawsuits. I discuss them
here—in spite of their obvious weaknesses—for two purposes. First, as
legally unconvincing as they are, they have been aggressively raised in the
SB277 discussions, and may well be raised in other states during legislative
debates: it may therefore be useful to arm policy makers, public activists and
courts with ready explanation of the problems. Second, I think the claims
shed important light on the frame of mind of the most extreme of opponents
to mandates.
1. Liability Protections and Unavoidably Unsafe
The Buck lawsuit claimed, and Whitlow suggested, that the liability
protections manufacturers enjoy are a reason to reject mandates since they
imply that vaccines carry risks.248

243
244
245
246
247
248

See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63–66 (2000); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
533–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923).
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176–77 (1922).
Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 542–43 (2d Cir. 2015).
Workman v. Mingo Cty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2011).
Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1089 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
Buck Complaint, supra note 87, at 10; Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief. at 17,
Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 2016).

258

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:1

In part, the claim, as described in Buck, seemed to draw on a
misunderstanding of the term Unavoidably Unsafe.249 The appellate brief states:
[A]ll vaccine designs are “unavoidably unsafe” (factually and legally). Under
federal law, all vaccine designs all legally presumed to come with the risk of
“Unavoidable adverse side effects.” In short, all vaccines are “unavoidably
unsafe” because their designs are presumed to be “unavoidably defective.”
Plaintiffs’ argument on appeal is simple and straightforward: no state may
mandate unavoidably unsafe products—i.e., known to cause indiscriminate
death and permanent disability—without a parent’s right to decline. . . .250

Buck’s plaintiffs, first and foremost, confuse the unavoidably unsafe
exception in comment k to the Restatement (Second) of Torts with the idea
of a defective product.251 Comment k itself explains that the category it
creates is not “defective”: “such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directives and warnings, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous.”252 In other words, the argument is based on a
pretty deep misunderstanding of the source of the term it uses.
Nor is there any justification to see “all” vaccines, as the brief claims, as
defective. Vaccines certainly have inherent risks—but every product, even a
perfectly made one, has risks. The existence of a risk alone does not make a
product defective, or all knives, all cars, all drugs would be defective going in
– and they are not: plaintiffs have to show more than a risk to win a product
liability case.253
Nothing is one hundred percent safe, but as mentioned, the small risks of
vaccines are far outweighed by their benefits, and the lives saved.254
Seatbelts, too, carry risks255—but are mandated because of their substantial
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The appellate court addressing this issue stated, very directly, that “Plaintiffs are, of course, quite
wrong.” Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135, 1143 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
Appellants’ Opening Brief at 13, Buck v. Smith, No. B279936 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016)
(internal citations omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–22(b)).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
Id.
JOHN S. ALLEE ET AL., PRODUCT LIABILITY, § 2.46.6-2.5[2] (2012).
See Maglione supra note 12, at 325. This point was also made by the Court of Appeal. Brown v.
Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135, 1143 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (“No doubt injuries and deaths have been
caused by vaccines, and no doubt there are cases of ‘unavoidable, adverse side effects.’ This does not
change the pertinent point: as Bruesewitz tells us, ‘the elimination of communicable diseases through
vaccination became “one of the greatest achievements” of public health in the 20th century.’ But
‘these gains are fragile’ and ‘[e]ven a brief period when vaccination programs are disrupted can lead
to children’s deaths.’” (quoting Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 230 (2011))).
See generally Seema Biswas et al., Abdominal Injury Patterns in Patients with Seatbelt Signs Requiring
Laparotomy, 7(4) J. EMERGENCY, TRAUMA, & SHOCK 295 (2014); William N. Evans & John D.
Graham, Risk Reduction or Risk Compensation? The Case of Mandatory Safety-Belt use Laws, 4 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 61 (1991).
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benefits in saving lives.256 In other words, the mere fact that there is a (small)
risk attached to vaccines does not prevent the state from mandating them
when the benefits are larger, just as the states may require a child undergo
life-saving surgery—even though surgery carries undeniable risks—when the
risks of no surgery are higher.257
Nor are liability protections in contrast with a mandate. To protect the
vaccine supply, in 1986 Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act, which created, among other things, a no-fault program to
compensate for the potential harms from vaccines.258 The program has
several goals, among them, and likely most important, to ensure the national
vaccine supply and keep vaccine prices affordable by protecting
manufacturers from unpredictable liability259 and to address the
shortcomings of the tort system with a no-fault forum designed to resolve
vaccine injury claims “quickly, easily, with certainty and generosity.”260 In
other words, liability protections for manufacturers in the United States are
part of a parcel that provides claimants a much easier process than having to
go through the regular civil courts would.261 The existence of such a forum
is not an argument against school mandates that make schools safer.
This claim, therefore, is simply implausible.
2. RICO
The core of one of the lawsuits—Middleton—is a Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization (“RICO”) claim.262 That claim, as presented here, is
extremely weak. The only reason to analyze it is that other states passing
immunization laws may well face identical claims from litigating non-lawyers.
Having the explanation why these claims are invalid at hand might be helpful.
RICO claims against legislatures passing vaccine-related legislation and
governors signing such legislation simply will not work. Under our
256

257
258
259
260
261

262

See generally Christopher S. Carpenter & Mark Stehr, The Effects of Mandatory Seatbelt Laws on Seatbelt
Use, Motor Vehicle Fatalities, and Crash-Related Injuries Among Young Adults, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 642
(2008); Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, The Effects of Mandatory Seat Belt Laws on Driving Behavior and
Traffic Fatalities, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 828 (2003).
See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–aa-34 (2012).
Geoffrey Evans et al., Legal Issues, in VACCINES 1481 (Stanley A. Plotkin et al. eds. 2013).
H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, pt. 1, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344.
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 562 U.S. 223, 227–28 (2011). The program has its issues, but also substantial
benefits. For more discussion of it, see generally ANNA KIRKLAND, VACCINE COURT: THE LAW
AND POLITICS OF INJURY 6–9 (2016) and Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized
Courts: Lessons from the VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631 (2015).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968 (1990).
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jurisprudence, as the court’s decision in Middleton highlighted, legislators are
absolutely immune from monetary damages suits for legislative activities
(passing laws is clearly legislative)—including from RICO claims.263 So even
if the plaintiffs establish the elements of RICO—and they do not—the
legislators they sued would be immune, for good reason. The goal of the
doctrine of legislative immunity is to allow legislators to act and speak freely
when representing their constituents, without fear of intimidation by
lawsuits.264 Under the Eleventh Amendment the Governor, too, is immune
from damages suits when he acts in his official capacity.265
Even if courts ignore immunity, or plaintiffs choose defendants without
immunity, the RICO claim is not appropriate in this context. The RICO
Act266 was originally created to allow the government to capture and deal
with organized crime, but its use quickly expanded to other contexts.267 The
act allows for criminal action against certain kinds of activities, but also allows
for civil suits, with the tempting remedy of treble damages for successful
plaintiffs.268 The courts have interpreted RICO expansively.269 Plaintiffs,
however, have gone beyond that expansive interpretation, in ways that
suggest abuse of the law in a variety of contexts.270
In this lawsuit, too, RICO appears overused. The magistrate’s
recommendation, accepted by the judge, explains part of the reason it is not
appropriate:

263

264

265
266
267

268

269
270

Middleton v. Pan, No. 2:16-cv-05224-SVW-AGR, 2016 WL 7053936, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15,
2016) (citing Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 (1998) (noting that legislators hold immunity
from liability)); see also Chappell v. Robbins, 73 F.3d 918, 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1996).
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972) (holding that the purpose of legislative immunity
is “to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile
judiciary”).
Middleton, 2017 WL 7053936, at *7 (noting that the Eleventh Amendment gives the governor
immunity from civil liability).
18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968 (1990).
Paul A. Batista, The Uses and Misuses of Rico in Civil Litigation: A Guide for Plaintiffs and Defendants, 8 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 181, 181–83 (1983) (“The emerging use of RICO in the context of traditional civil lawsuits
presents unique opportunities. . . .”); Nicholas L. Nybo, A Three-Ring Circus: The Exploitation of Civil RICO,
How Treble Damages Caused It, and Whether Rule 11 Can Remedy the Abuse, 18 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
19, 24–26 (2013) (discussing frivolous claims brought forth by private plaintiffs).
Lee Coppola & Nicholas DeMarco, Civil RICO: How Ambiguity Allowed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act to Expand Beyond its Intended Purpose, 38 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
241, 242 (2012) (“In addition to severe criminal penalties, RICO also provides a civil action for treble
damages where an aggrieved party may recovery for injury to their business or property. . . .”).
Id.
Nybo, supra note 267, at 25–27.
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The court is hard pressed to see any way in which Plaintiffs’ challenge to
SB 277 could plausibly fall within RICO. Section 1961 contains only the
definitions. In the event Plaintiffs attempt to amend the RICO claims,
Plaintiffs are advised that they must allege injury to their business or property
by reason of a violation of § 1962. The FAC does not contain allegations of
injury to Plaintiffs’ business or property.
Section 1962(a) provides that it is unlawful “for any person who has
received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity . . . to use or invest . . . any part of such income . . .
in. . . operation of . . . any enterprise.” The FAC contains no such
allegations. Moreover, under §1962(a), Plaintiffs must “allege facts tending
to show that he or she was injured by the use or investment of racketeering
income.” Injury from alleged racketeering acts that generated the income
is not sufficient.
Absent allegations of a viable RICO violation, Plaintiffs’ allegations of a
conspiracy to violate RICO under § 1962(d) also fail to state a claim.271

In other words, RICO is not a synonym for “something is wrong,
someone did something bad.”272 RICO is a specific act that requires meeting
exacting legal standards. In this case, plaintiffs did not say which one of the
enumerated federal crimes in Section 1961’s definition of “Racketeering
Activity” defendants are supposed to have violated. RICO does not cover
any corrupt conduct or ethically problematic conduct: it addresses a specific
set of crimes. Plaintiffs allege corruption and conspiracy, but that is not
enough. Their mention of campaign contributions might suggest they think
there was bribery—but legal campaign contributions are not bribery. In
other words, it is unclear what the specific racketeering activity is. General
claims of obstruction of justice and oath violation are not enough to form a
basis for a RICO claim, either. Civil rights violations alone, even if they did
occur, are not racketeering activity, either.273
As the state pointed out in its motion to dismiss, “RICO’s civil remedy
section ‘requires as a threshold for standing an injury to ‘business or
property.’’”274 Plaintiffs did not claim an injury to their property, only to their
liberty, so on this, too, they fail. It is hard to see any direct injury to property
from school immunization mandates; they do not focus on property, but on
271

272

273
274

Report & Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge, supra note 67, at 17–18 (internal citations
omitted) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495–97 (1985); then quoting Nugget
Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429, 437 (9th Cir. 1992)).
For a humorous and less than politically correct treatment of the issue that is nonetheless
sophisticated and accurate, see Ken White, Lawsplainer: IT’S NOT RICO, DAMMIT, POPEHAT
(June 14, 2016), https://www.popehat.com/2016/06/14/lawsplainer-its-not-rico-dammit/.
Bowen v. Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that civil rights violations are not
racketeering).
State’s Motion to Dismiss at 21, Middleton v. Pan, 2017 WL 7053936 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2016)
(No. 2:16-cv-05224-SVW-AGR) (quoting Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010)).
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preventing outbreaks. A weak argument could be made that being required
to forego income to homeschool affects property or business, but that is a very
tenuous connection to the alleged racketeering activity.
In other words, the RICO claim is unfounded because plaintiffs did not
even try to meet the requirements of a RICO suit. Even if they had, passing
a law that plaintiffs think is the result of special interests’ influence is not
racketeering activity. The plaintiffs are attempting to force a scenario that is
just a bad match to a RICO claim into that mold.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs fighting against school immunization mandates must overcome
two obstacles. First, they must overcome the strong public policy reasons
behind mandates—stronger mandates reduce outbreaks,275 prevent deaths,
suffering, and reduce costs.276 Second, they must overcome the long-standing
jurisprudence that supports these mandates—exactly because of their
substantial benefits for children and the community.277 In fighting SB277,
plaintiffs tried a variety of legal strategies and creative arguments to combat
the law, but so far courts have consistently rejected the arguments. This Article
outlines the claims, analyzes them, and explains why continuing to reject these
claims is the correct legal conclusion, as well as the correct public policy.
It is easy to sympathize with parents who are so frightened from vaccines
that they see being required to vaccinate their children as a condition to
sending them to school as coercion. Fear is understandable, even when
based on misconceptions. But this sympathy is not a reason to prevent states
from acting to protect children and the community by passing strong
immunization laws. After all, it is important to remember that the children
left unvaccinated also depend on the community having high vaccination
rates. Lacking protection of their own, they are at high risk during an
outbreak of preventable diseases. Courts’ unwavering support of school
immunization protects children in the school, the community, and yes, the
children whose parents are frightened of vaccinating because of (incorrect)
anti-vaccine claims. In this case, law, justice, and sound policy collide.

275
276
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See Bradford & Mandich, supra note 7, at 1383 (“States that had the most effective portfolio of
policies had lower incidences of pertussis.”).
See Moser, supra note 81, at 633 (“By disregarding evidence of the safety and effectiveness of vaccines
and choosing not to vaccinate their children, some parents are increasing the risk of outbreaks and
their attendant costs.”); Zhou, supra note 91, at 581 (discussing the number of projected deaths
saved and costs averted).
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (discussing the ways in which a state can
restrict parental control).
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APPENDIX
Table 1: The Four SB277 Lawsuits278
Whitlow
Seventeen
individual
plaintiffs and
four
organizations,
including
partially
vaccinated &
some claiming
vaccine injuries.
Federal District
Court,
Southern
District of
California

278

Buck

Middleton

Plaintiffs
Eight individual Over twenty
plaintiffs, very
pro-se litigants,
strongly antiled by a nonvaccine.
lawyer.

Venue
State Superior
Federal District
Court, Los
Court, Central
Angeles;
District of
continued to
California
California
Court of
Appeals of the
Second District

Torrey-Love
Seven
individual
plaintiffs, three
parents and
four minor
children, and
the organization
“A Voice for
Choice.”
First round:
Federal District
Court, Central
District of
California
Second round:
State Superior
Court, Placer
County

The full name of each lawsuit was included in the text. See supra Part III. For ease of use, the first
plaintiff’s name is used as the title.
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Whitlow
Plaintiff: James
S. Turner,
Robert T.
Moxley,
Kimberly M.
Mack
Rosenberg,
Carl M. Lewis
Defendant:
Jonathan E
Rich (Office of
the Attorney
General)

Buck

Middleton

Lawyers
Plaintiff: T.
Plaintiff: No
Matthew
lawyer, but
Phillips (T
Travis
Matthew
Middleton, lead
Phillips Law
plaintiff, is a
Offices)
repeat litigant
Defendant:
and considers
Jonathan E
himself an
Rich (Office of
expert. He is
the Attorney
clearly the
General)
leading spirit.
Defendant:
Cara L. Jenkins
(Office of
Legislative
Counsel)
Jacquelyn
Young and
Jonathan E.
Rich (Office of
the Attorney
General)
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Torrey-Love
Plaintiff: Brad
A. Hakala (The
Hakala Law
Group PC),
James Leon
Moultrie, III
(Hakala Law
Group PC),
Jeffrey B.
Compangano
(Hakala Law
Group PC)
Defendant:
Jacquelyn
Young and
Jonathan E.
Rich (Office of
the Attorney
General)
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Whitlow
On appeal from
denied
injunction in
the U.S. District
Court for the
Southern
District of
California
(Plaintiffs
voluntary
dismiss their
claim without
prejudice Aug.
31, 2016)
(Filed in state
court, removed
to federal court,
remanded back
to state)
States demurrer
accepted by
Superior Court
Judge.
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Buck

Middleton

Procedural Posture
Demurrer is
It is a bit
sustained,
unclear. The
without leave to initial case was
amend
dismissed but
Plaintiffs
the judge
appealed,
accepted, in
parties filed
that decision,
briefs on
the plaintiffs’
appeal.
second
amended
complaint as
another claim,
and that
proceeding is
not finished. In
the meantime,
the plaintiffs
filed a Habeas
motion with the
Ninth Circuit,
for reasons not
quite clear.
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Torrey-Love
Defendant
motion to
dismiss granted,
Plaintiff motion
for preliminary
injunction
denied.
A Voice for
Choice
appealed the
dismissal to the
California
Court of Appeal
of the Second
District.
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Whitlow
Plaintiffs assert
they are
challenging the
elimination of
the personal
belief
exemption;
claim violation
of free exercise
of religion
under First
Amendment,
violation of due
process, equal
protection, right
of education, 29
U.S.C. § 794
(no
discrimination
under federal
grants and
programs)

Buck

Middleton

Main Claims
Violation of: 1)
1) Violation of
Free Exercise
RICO under 18
Clause, 2) right U.S.C. §§ 1961,
to an education 1962(a), (d),
under Article
2) conspiracy to
IX, § 5 of
promote the
California
sale and use of
constitution,
biological
3) Equal
weapons on
Protection
California
Clause,
citizens 18
4) Health and
U.S.C. § 175,
Safety Code
3) conspiracy to
§ 24175,
promote the
5) Due Process
sale and use of
Clause
chemical
weapons on
California
citizens 18
U.S.C. § 178,
4) violation of
18 U.S.C. §§
241, 242,
5) violation of
42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1986,
6) intentional
infliction of
emotional
distress
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Torrey-Love
Violation of: 1)
substantive due
process rights
under
Fourteenth
Amendment,
2) the Equal
Protection
Clause of the
Fourteenth
Amendment,
and 3) 42
U.S.C. § 1983
right to refuse
immunization,
right to public
education,
equal
protection,
unconstitutional
condition

